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HIS Article discusses the jurisdictional power of state courts to
adjudicate family law disputes involving persons who are not
domiciliaries or residents of the forum state. It examines a series of
recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court and applies their
teachings in the context of family law litigation. Particular attention is
given to the requirements of the due process clause, the relationship of the
due process clause to principles of full faith and credit, and legislative responses to problems commonly encountered by family law practitioners
who are in the business of litigating family law disputes in the interstate
context. In this regard, the Article analyzes and compares the provisions
of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 that compel enforcement of sister state child
custody determinations with comparable provisions of the Texas Family
Code. A principal thrust of the Article is to demonstrate the relationship
among these three legislative schemes, which are designed to deal with
problems of the "interstate child" who remains trapped in the conflict of
laws.

PART A.
I.

THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND FAMILY LAW LITIGATION

EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

A.

The HistoricalImportance of the Nature of the Action

Prior to the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Shaffer v. Heitner,I the method of analysis used to justify the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over a nonresident was based upon the differences among in rem jurisdiction, quasi in rem jurisdiction, and in personam jurisdiction. Since these historical terms, which differentiate one
type of jurisdiction from another, will not be abandoned by lawmakers
and cannot be excised neatly from the many places they appear, a present
day mastery of the old vocabulary remains important. As explained in
Shaffer: "[When] a court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over the
defendant's person, the action and judgment are denominated 'in per1. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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sonam' and can impose a personal obligation on the defendant in favor of
the plaintiff."'2 A classic example of a personal judgment is a money judgment enforceable against all of the defendant's property subject to
execution.
If jurisdiction is based on the court's power over property within its
territory, the action is called "in rem" or "quasi in rem." The effect of
a judgment in such a case is limited to the property that supports juliability
risdiction and [such a judgment] does not impose a personal
3
on the property owner, since he is not before the court.
In other words even when a court was unable to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, the presence of property within the forum was
sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident property owner. This jurisdiction was limited to the extent of the nonresident's
interest in the property when the property was properly subjected to the
jurisdiction of the forum court.4 According to the first Restatement of
Judgments, a judgment in rem affected the interests of all persons in the
property while a judgment quasi in rem affected the interests of particular
persons in designated property.5 More significantly from the standpoint of
jurisdiction over nonresident property owners' interests in such property,
however, was the fact that one variety of quasi in rem jurisdiction did not
require the resident plaintiff to have any preexisting claim to an interest in
the subject property. 6 In the ordinary case the only relationship between
the property subjected to jurisdiction and the claim asserted against the
nonresident was the defendant's ownership of property in the forum state.
The dispute did not need any relationship to the property. The heart of
this jurisdictional principle was that, with respect to litigation that otherwise had nothing to do with the property, the nonresident's property could
be captured and held hostage through the exercise of legal process directed
at the property.
The conceptual scheme based upon differences among personal, quasi in
rem, and in rem judgments worked reasonably well in garden-variety tort
and contract litigation. Moreover, litigating property disputes where the
property is located at the time of the commencement of the litigation and
the time of judgment is frequently sensible. Even so, some litigation did
not easily fit the three categories.
As least as early as Pennoyer v. Neff,7 Justice Field had concluded that
actions that involved the civil status of an inhabitant of the forum state
2. Id at 199.
3. Id.
4. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727-28 (1878). Two reasons are given in the
opinion concerning the attachment of the property. First, attachment combined with constructive service (publication) provided a greater assurance that the nonresident would actually receive notice. Secondly, since the jurisdiction depended upon the defendant's
ownership of property within the forum, attachment was necessary to preserve jurisdiction.
5. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 5-9 (1942).
6. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); see also Zammit, Quasi in Rem: Outmoded
and Unconstitutional?,49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 668 (1975).
7. 95 U.S. 714, 733-35 (1878).
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could be litigated there, even when the other party was a nonresident who
owned no property there and had no ties or relations with the forum state.
The action was considered in rem or quasi in rem. Since relatively few
proceedings concerning the dissolution of the matrimonial relationship involve only questions of status, this jurisdictional scheme presented situations when, for example, the divorce court had the power to render a
divorce decree, but did not have the power to make any other order binding upon the nonresident except orders involving the nonresident's property located in the forum state. This result occurred because the
adjudication of questions of support required personal jurisdiction. Conservatorship and custody questions are also encountered in typical dissolution proceedings. The decision as to which category was applicable to
them varied. Should a child custody decree binding upon the nonresident
require personal authority and jurisdiction over the nonresident? Was the
question of conservatorship similar to the question of support, or should it
be handled under the rule that only in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction,
based upon the domicile or physical presence of the child in the forum,
was necessary? As these questions suggest, the historical method of analyzing the matter in terms of the nature of the action was not particularly
helpful in typical domestic relations litigation.
A related problem concerning the method of providing notice to the
nonresident appears to have been a byproduct of the scheme that sought to
classify actions as either in rem, quasi in rem, or in personam. Since personal service was necessary to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction
(absent consent) and since personal service of citation could not be obtained against a nonresident (prior to the development of long-arm statutes
establishing a fictional service agent in the forum), the notion developed
that personal service upon a nonresident within the state itself conferred
jurisdiction.8 On the other hand, in rem or quasi in rem proceedings, by
definition less expansive forms of jurisdiction because of their effect only
upon property within the forum, involved other forms of citation, which
were generally characterized as constructive service. Some forms of constructive service, such as citation by publication, were not always reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action; thus, the parties were not afforded an opportunity
to present their objections. 9 Despite the fact that modern due process notions reject the idea that the classification of the action determines the
mode of service,' 0 the application of the traditional thought process has led
some courts and commentators to perpetuate the perceived relationship
8. See Sgitcovich v. Sgitcovich, 150 Tex. 398, 404, 241 S.W.2d 142, 146 (1951). "While
personal service is always necessary if a judgment in personam is to be rendered against a
non-resident of a state, who does not voluntarily appear or otherwise consent to some other
method of service . . . ." Id (emphasis added).
9. See Johnson, Citation by Publication.- A Sham Upon Due Process, 36 TEX. B.J. 205
(1973).
10. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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between the nature of the action and the mode of service. II
B.

The Evolution of JudicialJurisdiction Theories

TraditionalBases of Jurisdiction

L

a. Domicile of the Defendant. Domicile in the forum state has traditionally been considered sufficient to render a domiciliary of a state amenable to process issued by its courts.' 2 Moreover, a true domiciliary
relationship' 3 rendered a defendant, who was temporarily absent from
home, subject to personal jurisdiction even when served in a sister state or
abroad. 14
b. PhysicalPresenceof the Defendant. Another traditional basis for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is personal service upon a nonresident
while the nonresident is physically present within the territorial boundaries of the forum state.' 5 This basis for jurisdiction, which has its foundation in the notion that "'[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established,' "16
was pushed to its humorous limits when it was used to justify service upon
an airline passenger in the airspace over state C while he was in flight from
state A to state B. '7 At least two common law restrictions have traditionally been placed upon the physical presence basis for personal jurisdiction.
If the physical presence occurs in connection with the making of special
appearance, the presence has been considered privileged.' 8 This limitation
was conceived because the opposite result tended to nullify procedures
permitting a limited appearance to challenge an assertion of jurisdiction
over a nonresident. '9 In addition, according to the general rule, presence
procured by fraud or trickery is ineffective to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 20 Since due process requires that assertions of jurisdiction over a nonresident be based upon the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation, 2 1 rather than upon the mutually
11. See, e.g., Spinnler v. Armstrong, 63 S.W.2d 1071, 1075 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1933, no writ); see also Aamco Automatic Transmission Inc. v. Evans Advertising Agency,
Inc., 450 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ refd n.r.e.).
12. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1940).
13. Technical domicile does not count. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91-92 (1917).
14. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438-39 (1932); Becker v. Becker, 218 S.W.
542, 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1920, no writ).
15. Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975,
no writ).
16. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977) (quoting Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720).
17. See Grace v. McArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
18. Oates v. Blackburn, 430 S.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1968, writ refd n.r.e.).
19. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12; TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
20. Cornell v. Cornell, 402 S.W.2d 571,572-73 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1966),rev'don
other grounds, 413 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1967).

21. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977); see infra notes 64-85 and accompanying
text.
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exclusive sovereignty of the states, physical presence, without more, may
no longer support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.
c. Presenceof Propertyin the Forum State. Prior to Shaffer v. Heitner a
divorce court could adjudicate the rights of both spouses in all personal
and real property within the court's jurisdiction. 22 In Shaffer the Supreme
Court held that the same standard of fairness applies in determining
whether jurisdiction can be exercised over property owned by nonresidents. Hence, the proper analysis considers the relationship among the
forum state, the defendant, and the litigation. In this regard:
[Wihen claims to theproperly itselfare the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiffand the defendant, it would be unusualfor
the State where the property is locatednot to havejurisdiction. In such
cases, the defendant's claim to property located in the State would
normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State's protection of his interest. The State's strong interests in assuring the marketability of property within its borders and in providing a procedure for
peaceful resolution of disputes about the possession of that property
would also support jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that important records and witnesses will be found in the State. The presence of
propertymay alsofavorjurisdiction in cases, such as suitsfor injury suffered on the landof an absentee owner, where the defendant's ownership
of theproperty is conceded but the cause of action23is otherwise relatedto
rights and duties growing out of that ownershp.
On the other hand, the Court in Shaffer also recognized that in some circumstances the presence of property will not support the forum court's
jurisdiction even when the litigation involves claims to the property itself.
Such a result may occur, for example, when a spouse moves matrimonial
property to a foreign forum in order to secure an award of all the property
24
to himself.
d Civil Status Determinations. Since Pennoyer v. Nef 2 5 a state court
has been able to determine or alter the marital status of one of its citizens
26
even when the other party is a nonresident or a citizen of another state.
As held by the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. North Carolina,27 "it is plain that each state, by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of marriage, can alter within
its own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled there, even
though the other spouse is absent. ' 28 The basis for this jurisdiction is the
nexus between the domiciliary and the forum, which has an important and
22. See Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
23. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1977) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
24. Id at 208 n.25; see also Note, The Power of a State to Affect Title in a ChattelAtypicall, Remoyedto It,47 COLUM. L. REV. 767 (1947).
25. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
26. Id at 734-35.
27. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
28. Id at 298-99.
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legitimate interest in the marital status of its domiciliary. 29 By analogy to
cases involving the presence of property in the forum, this jurisdiction traditionally has been termed quasi in rem in order to accommodate it technically within the theoretical scheme described in Pennoyer.30 Jurisdiction
to alter civil status was expressly recognized in Shaffer v. Heitner. In a
footnote the Supreme Court stated that "[w]e do not suggest that jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, such as the particularized rules governing adjudications of status, are inconsistent with the
standard of fairness.'
From the standpoint of constitutional requirements, domicile is probably not the only basis for jurisdiction to dissolve the marital relationship.
Extended military service may be sufficient. 32 Yet, the determination that
the spouse seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the forum court is a domiciliary is not purely a question of local law. A judgment in one state is
conclusive upon the merits in every other state, but only when the court of
the first state had power to adjudicate the merits. 33 Consequently, the determination that the resident spouse was a domiciliary may be tested by a
court in a sister state. As stated in Williams v. North Carolina:
The State of domiciliary origin should not be bound by an unfounded, even if not collusive, recital in the record of a court of another State. As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of domicil,
upon which depends the power to exert judicial authority, a State not
a party to the execution of such judicial authority in another State but
seriously affected by it has a right, when asserting its own unquestioned
authority, to ascertain the truth or existence of that crucial
34
fact.

The finding of domicile may be disregarded on the basis of "cogent evidence" to the contrary. 35 As explained in Layton v. Layton ,36 a collateral
attack should not be successful when the defendant making the37attack has
already contested the jurisdictional issues in the divorce court.
With respect to durational residence requirements, the United States
Supreme Court has held that a one-year residence requirement is constitutional if the requirement is based on grounds other than purely budgetary
considerations or administrative convenience. 38 The state's interest in
avoiding becoming a divorce mill and its interest in seeing that its decrees
be accorded full faith and credit support imposition of a one-year resi29. Dosamantes v. Dosamantes, 500 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973,

writ dism'd).
30. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

31. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 86, 208 n.30 (1977). For a full discussion of this footnote, see infra text accompanying notes 203-18.
32. See Wood v. Wood, 320 S.W.2d 807, 811 (Tex. 1959).

33.
34.
35.
36.

Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
Id at 230.
Id. at 236.
538 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).

37. Id. at 647; see also Kellogg v. Kellogg, 559 S.W.2d 126, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tex-

arkana 1977, no writ).
38. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406 (1975).
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dence requirement. 39
Questions of custody and conservatorship must be separated from marital dissolution status determinations. The due process fairness analysis is
enormously more complex in cases involving suits affecting the parentchild relationship. Most of the difficult problems are presented in this
area. 4o
2. The Minimum Contacts Doctrine
The modem era of due process analysis begins with Justice Stone's opinion in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington .4 1 From the present day perspective, the importance of the opinion rests on its insistence that in
making the jurisdictional determination, a court's power over the defendant's person is not the central concern. Rather the problem is to determine
under what circumstances a nonresident may be justly subjected to a local
suit when the matter is considered in light of our federal system of government and "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. '42 The
main difficulty with this more flexible approach is in translating the idea
into a course of conduct in the particular contexts in which the problem is
likely to arise.
In InternationalShoe the issue was whether a foreign corporation was
subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Washington as a result of the
conduct of its representatives who sold shoes in the state. Consequently,
Justice Stone's often-quoted formula was created in the context of a commercial setting:
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal
service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not
' '43
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
The opinion reflects dissatisfaction with a purely quantitative evaluation
of the nonresident's activities. The determination of whether subjecting a
nonresident to a local suit is fair also depends upon the quality and nature
of the activity. In given cases, when a nexus exists between the activity in
the forum state and the litigation problem, the forum state's exercise of
jurisdiction might be fair and reasonable even though the activity was of a
limited character. On the other hand, continuous and systematic activity
of a nonresident within the forum ordinarily supports the exercise of jurisdiction, even when the activity did not give rise to the litigation. The due
process clause, however, does not support the exercise of jurisdiction over
39. Id at 408-09.
40. See infra Part A, III.

41. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
42. Id. at 316; see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203-05 (1977) (discussing International Shoe).
43. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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a nonresident "with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." 44
Although the Court in InternationalShoe clearly altered the way in which
the jurisdictional analysis is conducted, the minimum contacts test is not
particularly illuminating or helpful when concrete problems require its application. The significance of the decision involves its departure from the
tradition of a physical power conception of personal jurisdiction. As commentators have noted, "the 'minimum contacts' doctrine has the merit of
'45
flexibility and the defect of vagueness.
Prior to 1970, the United States Supreme Court decided four other cases
on the subject of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. In
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 46 the Court reiterated that jurisdiction could be asserted against a nonresident when the cause of action
did not arise out of the nonresident's activities within the forum state, if
the nonresident's other activities in that state were "substantial. '47 In McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co. 4 8 a personal judgment by a California court against a Texas-based insurance company was upheld, because
the Texas company sent premium statements to policy holders who resided
in California. At the time, McGee was thought to support a very broad
interpretation of the minimum contacts doctrine such that virtually any
49
contact would support the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident.
This view was quickly eroded by the Supreme Court's elusive opinion in
Hanson v. Denckla.s° In Hanson the Court held that the minimum contacts test of InternationalShoe is not satisfied unless the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 5 1
Thereafter, until its opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner,5 2 the Supreme Court left
the resolution of this problem to state and lower federal courts.
Lower courts have fashioned more explicit tests for determining whether
the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident satisfies due process. Most
of these tests were developed in the context of tort or contract litigation.
Since the tests purport to be analyses of the due process requirements of
the fourteenth amendment, however, they are pertinent to domestic relations cases. A traditional favorite of the Texas Supreme Court is derived
from O'Brien v. Lanpar Co. ,3 in which the issue was whether an Illinois
judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in Texas. The test, which has
44. 326 U.S. at 319.
45. Gorfinkel & Lavine, Long-Arm Jurisdictionin California Under New Section 410.10
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1163, 1164 (1970).
46. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
47. Id at 447.
48. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
49. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clauseand the In Personam Jurisdiction ofState Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 607
(1958).
50. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
51. Id at 253.
52. 433 U.S. 186 (1977); see in/ra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
53. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
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been frequently repeated by Texas courts of appeals, has three
components:
(1) The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state;
(2) the cause ofaction must arisefrom, or be connected with, such act or
transaction; and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state
must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,
consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the
the
benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded
54
respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation.
The due process clause does not, however, require a relationship between
the defendant's act or transaction in the forum state and the cause of action in all cases. 55 The Supreme Court of Texas recently explained that
the O'Brien test has been the subject of some controversy and that "the
second prong [of the test] is unnecessary when the nonresident defendant's
presence in the forum through numerous contacts is of such a nature...
'56
as to satisfy the demands of the ultimate test of due process."
Lower federal courts have formulated more flexible tests. In Hearne v.
Dow-Badische Chemical Co. 57 a federal district court indicated that the
application of the minimum contacts doctrine involves a consideration of
five factors: (1) the nature and character of the business; (2) the number
and type of activities within the forum; (3) whether such activities gave rise
to the cause of action; (4) whether the forum has some special interest in
granting relief; and (5) the relative convenience of the parties.
Several federal district5 8 and state appeals courts 59 have used the
Hearne test. Apparently, from. the manner in which these other courts
have applied this formula, no one factor is essential to each case. In other
words, it is not essential that the cause of action arise from or be connected
with the activities conducted in the forum when the nonresident's unrelated activities in the forum are substantial. This interpretation provides
the Hearne test with the merit of flexibility.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated a method of analysis in
54. Id. at 342 (emphasis added) (quoting Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc.,
62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245, 251 (1963)).
55. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952); Prejean v.
Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1981).
56. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex.
1982). The quotation is taken from the plurality opinion authored by Justice Wallace. The
concurrence, authored by Justice Campbell and joined by Justice McGee, indicated their
agreement with the substance of the quotation. See also U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt,
553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
57. 224 F. Supp. 90, 99 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
58. See Odom v. Thomas, 338 F. Supp. 877, 878 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Jetco Elec. Indus.,
Inc. v. Gardiner, 325 F. Supp. 80, 83 (S.D. Tex. 1971), rev'don othergrounds, 473 F.2d 1228
(5th Cir. 1973).
59. See Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Country Clubs, Inc. v. Ward, 461 S.W.2d 651, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau60 that identifies two main factors:
"First, 'there must be some minimum contact with the state which results
from an affirmative act of the defendant.' Secondly, 'it must be fair and
reasonable to require the defendant to come into the state and defend the
action.' ",61 Although the Cousteau dual test is not explicit in its inclusion
of the factors contained in the Hearne test, the opinion clearly indicates
that factors of the type mentioned in Hearne are relevant to Cousteau's
"minimum contact" and "fair and reasonable" standards. The requirement that the cause of action be related to the minimum contact need not
be satisfied in every case. The Cousteau test appears to be the current
favorite of federal district courts, and it was even quoted by the Texas
Supreme Court in U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Bur 62 with apparent approval. It is now relatively clear that a majority of the Texas Supreme
Court does not interpret the due process clause to require a nexus between
the minimum contact and the cause of action in all cases. Consequently,
when the O'Brien test is advanced for that proposition, it is important to
understand that viable counterarguments are available. 63
3. The Minimum Contacts Doctrine After Shaffer v. Heitner
In a series of cases decided in the late 1970s the United States Supreme
Court recast the minimum contacts doctrine and at the same time extended
its applicability to what the Court called the in rem wing of Pennoyer v.
Neff.64 In 1977 the Court decided Shaffer v. Heitner.65 A stockholder's
derivative action was instituted in Delaware against Greyhound Corporation and several of its officers who were also stockholders of the corporation. For -many of the individual defendants, no showing of any contact
with Delaware was made that would support a personal judgment against
them. A Delaware procedure called sequestration was used to seize constructively the individual defendants' ownership interests in the Greyhound Corporation. This seizure was accomplished by placing stop
transfer orders on the corporation's books. The court's order clearly indicated that the sequestration would be vacated as to any defendant who
personally appeared in the action. In other words, the stock was held hostage to compel the personal appearance of the individual defendants who
otherwise would forfeit their interests in Greyhound Corporation. After
60. 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).

61. Id.at 494 (citation omitted).
62. 553 S.W.2d at 762. The Texas Supreme Court opinion also quoted the O'Brien test
and apparently applied it to the problem at hand. Since the cause of action was "connected
with the contractual obligation. . . partially performable in Texas," no need arose to choose
among the due process tests. Id.
63. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex.
1982), quoted supra at text accompanying note 56. The Fifth Circuit has indicated that the
due process clause does not require a relationship between the defendant's activities and the
cause of action if the activities are "continuous and systematic activities." Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1266-67 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Boyd v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
CA-3-80-1151-G (N.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 1981).
64. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
65. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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tracing the development of the minimum contacts doctrine and quoting
InternationalShoe, the Supreme Court recast the doctrine in the following
terms: "Thus, the relationship among the defendant, theforum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on
which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry
into personal jurisdiction. ' 66 This new formulation of the minimum contacts doctrine lends a slightly different emphasis to the method of analysis.
The minimum contacts formula articulated in InternationalShoe definitely focuses upon the relationship between the defendant and the forum.
The character of the litigation and its relationship with the defendant's
contacts are also important, primarily because a more extensive number of
contacts are required when the litigation is unrelated to them. On the
other hand, the interest of the forum state in the litigation has played a
somewhat smaller role, especially after Hanson v. Denckla.67 In Hanson
the Supreme Court stated: "The unilateral activity of those who claim
some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of [the Due Process
standard] will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity
.
"..
68 The Court in Shaffer, however, seemed to place the relationship
of the forum to the litigation on a somewhat more equal footing with the
relationship between the forum and the defendant. This modified formulation suggests greater emphasis on the forum's interest in adjudicating the
controversy. 69 On the other hand, the balance of the Shaffer opinion suggests that the state's interest must be particularly strong when the relationship of the defendant forum is insubstantial.
In Shaffer the argument was made on appeal that because the nonresident defendants held positions as officers and directors of a corporation
chartered in Delaware, Delaware's interest in supervising the management
of the corporation should give its courts jurisdiction over a stockholder's
derivative action although the nonresidents had never set foot in Delaware. In answering this contention, the Supreme Court made two responses, either of which would have been sufficient. First, the Court
stated:
This argument is undercut by the failure of the Delaware Legislature to assert the state interest appellee finds so compelling. Delaware
law bases jurisdiction, not on appellants' status as corporate
fiduciaries, but rather on the presence of their property in the State.
Although the sequestration procedure used here may be most frequently used in derivative suits against officers and directors

. . .

the

authorizing statute evinces no specific concern with such actions ....
If Delaware perceived its interest in securing jurisdiction over
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id at 204 (emphasis added).
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Id. at 253.
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444

U.S. 286 (1980), and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), suggest that some relationship
must exist between the defendant and the forum. See infra text accompanying note 85.
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corporate fiduciaries to be as great as Heitner suggests, we would expect it to70 have enacted a statute more clearly designed to protect that
interest.
This reasoning suggests that whether the state has identified a particular
interest in adjudicating the controversy must be ascertained from the statutory scheme. The second basis for discounting the importance of Delaware's interest was stated in more traditional terms. Quoting from
Hanson, the Shaffer Court stated that "[t]he issue is personal jurisdiction,
'72
not choice of law"; 7 1 Delaware was not "a fair forum for this litigation.
The last part of the Shaffer opinion discusses whether the nonresidents
implicitly consented to suit in Delaware when they acquired shares of
stock in a Delaware corporation. In rejecting this contention, the Court
concluded that the nonresidents "had no reason to expect to be haled
'7 3
before a Delaware court."
The next treatment of the minimum contacts doctrine by the United
States Supreme Court was Kulko v. Superior Court.74 In Kulko a mother
brought suit in California against her ex-husband to obtain custody of two
children and to increase his child support obligations. Under a prior separation agreement, the children were to remain with the father most of the
year and spend vacations with the mother. The mother was to receive
$3,000 for the children's support during the time they resided with her.
Although the parents had been married in California while Mr. Kulko was
in the armed forces, they lived as husband and wife in New York for thirteen years. After they separated, she moved to California, and he stayed in
New York. The father voluntarily sent one of the children with her belongings to California. The California courts considered this act sufficient
to support the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over him with respect to
both children. The father did not contest the California court's jurisdiction for the purpose of the custody determination. The Supreme Court
held that the father's purchase of a one-way plane ticket for his daughter
so that she could go to live with her mother was not sufficient to subject
him to personal jurisdiction in California with respect to either child. The
Court relied heavily upon the limiting language quoted above from Hanson v. Denckla. Professor Weintraub has suggested that the Kulko holding
does not necessarily have application to child custody determinations,
be75
cause the father did not attempt to appeal the custody issue.
From the standpoint of the relationship of the defendant to the forum,
the Kulko opinion concludes that the father's acquiescence in his daughter's desire to live with her mother did not constitute a purposeful act because "[a] father who agrees, in the interests of family harmony and his
70. 433 U.S. at 214-15.
71. Id at 215 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254).
72. 433 U.S. at 215.
73. Id at 216.
74. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
75. See Weintraub, Texas Long-Arm Jurisdictionin Family Law Cases, 32 Sw. L.J. 965,
981 (1978).
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children's preferences, to allow them to spend more time in California
than was required under a separation agreement can hardly be said to
have 'purposefully availed himself of the 'benefits and protections' of California's laws."'76 Furthermore, the Supreme Court considered the act of
acquiescing in the daughter's return an insufficient jurisdictional basis for
two other reasons. First, "[tihis single act is surely not one that a reasonable parent would expect to result in the substantial financial burden and
personal strain of litigating a child-support suit in a forum 3,000 miles
away, and we therefore see no basis on which it can be said that appellant
could reasonably have anticipated being 'haled before a [California]
court.' ",77 Secondly, the fact that the act involved personal, domestic relations rather than commercial activity designed to produce a commercial
benefit apparently was significant. The opinion indicates that noncommercial acts may be viewed differently: "[T]he mere act of sending a child to
California to live with her mother is not a commercial act and connotes no
intent to obtain or expectancy of receiving a corresponding benefit in the
make fair the assertion of that State's judicial
State that would
78
jurisdiction.
With respect to the relationship between the forum and the litigation,
the Court in Kulko recognized California's legitimate interests, but held
that certain legislation already protected those interests. "California's legitimate interest in ensuring the support of children resident in California
without unduly disrupting the children's lives, moreover, is already being
served by the State's participation in the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968." 79 Moreover, as in Shaffer v. Heitner,
the character of the statute upon which the exercise of jurisdiction was
predicated was considered to be of some importance. Kulko also suggests
that long-arm provisions should enumerate the specific fact situations in
which jurisdiction may be obtained. "California -has not attempted to assert any particularized interest in trying 80such cases in its courts by, e.g.,
enacting a special jurisdictional statute."
After Kulko, two Supreme Court decisions, World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson 8 ' and Rush v. Savchuk,82 extended the interpretation of
the new minimum contacts formulation to other types of litigation. Of
principal importance are the sections of the World- Wide Volkswagen opinion that explain the foreseeability notion mentioned first in Shaffer and
restated in Kulko.
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson the plaintiffs purchased
an Audi in New York. The following year plaintiffs moved to Arizona.
"As they passed through the State of Oklahoma, another car struck their
76. 436 U.S. at 94.

77. Id. at 97-98 (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

436 U.S. at 101 (emphasis added).
Id at 98.
Id.
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
444 U.S. 320 (1980).
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Audi in the rear," and they were injured. 83 They filed a products liability
action in Oklahoma against the manufacturer, the importer, regional distributor, and retailer. The retailer and the regional distributor made special appearances, which were overruled.
The Supreme Court determined that although it was foreseeable that an
automobile purchased in New York could arrive in Oklahoma and cause
injury there, this foreseeability was not the kind due process envisaged. To
be relevant, a different type of foreseeability was required:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant.
But the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product willfind its way into the forum State.
Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with theforum
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there. . . . The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the "orderly
administration of the laws" . .. gives a degree of predictability to the
legal system that allows potentialdefendants to structure theirprimary
conduct with some minimum assurance
as to where that conduct will and
84
will not render them liable to suit.
With respect to the relationship between the forum and the litigation
and the special interest of the forum in adjudicating the controversy, the
Court in World- Wide Volkswagen described the proper analysis:
As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only
so long as there exist "minimum contacts" between the defendant and
the forum State. [InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316]. The concept of
minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but
distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to
ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond
the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system.
The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described
in terms of "reasonableness" or "fairness." We have said that the defendant's contacts with the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.'" [Id ] The relationship between the defendant and
theforum must be such that it is "reasonable. . .to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there." [Id at
317]. Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding
that the burden on the defendant, while always aprimaryconcern, will
in an appropriatecase be considered in light of other relevantfactors,
including theforum State's interest in adjudicatingthe dispute, see [McGee, 355 U.S. at 2231; the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief, see [Kulko, 430 U.S. at 92], at least when that
interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiffs power to choose
the forum, cf. [Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37]; the interstate judicial
83. 444 U.S. at 288.
84. Id at 297 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
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system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies, see [Kulko, 430 U.S. at 93, 98].85
4. Modern Due Process Methodology
In Shaffer v. Heitner the Supreme Court recharacterized the test required by the due process clause in terms of the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation. In other words, the burden upon
the defendant, while always a primary concern, is not the only concern. As
the quoted excerpt from the Supreme Court's opinion in World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson indicates, the burden upon the defendant "will in an
appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including
the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute." Additional relevant
factors include the plaintiff's interest in obtaining effective relief in a convenient forum, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining "the
most efficient resolution of controversies," and "the shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."
Based upon the foregoing, the proper application of the due process
standard of fairness set forth in Shaffer v. Heitner requires that the legitimate interest of the forum state be balanced against the burden upon the
nonresident when the litigation is to be conducted in a distant forum. For
example, a consideration of the forum's legitimate interests in the civil status of its inhabitants and in the determination of ownership interests in
property within its territorial boundaries will normally mean that divorce
decrees may be rendered when one spouse is a true domiciliary and that
ownership interests in property may be adjudicated when the property is
located within the forum. Moreover, by giving explicit consideration to
the legitimate interest of the forum state, the due process fairness standard
described in Shaffer v. Heitner is particularly pertinent to custody cases
involving the interstate child, because the forum state's interest is particularly strong when the child's connection with the forum is significant.
Another significant aspect of the new due process methodology involves
the issue of whether the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there. Whether the defendant's activities in relation to the forum indicate that the defendant is or reasonably should be on notice that
he or she could be haled into its courts should be taken into account in
determining the relationship between the forum and the defendant. Just as
the reformulation of the due process standard in terms of the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation lends an emphasis to
the analysis different from the InternationalShoe "minimum contacts" formulation, the "haled into court" aspect of the new foreseeability principles
first enunciated in Shaffer and repeated in Kulko and World-Wide Volkswagen is analogous to the more cryptic "purposeful availment" require85. Id.
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ment of Hanson v. Denckla. Considerations such as the quality, nature,
and extent of the activity in the forum, the foreseeability of consequences
within the forum from activities outside it, and the relationship between
tle cause of action and the contacts relate to whether it can be said that the
defendant's actions constitute "purposeful availment," or in modern terms,
whether the defendant's activities in relation to the forum indicate that he
or she is on notice that he or she could be haled into its courts. This aspect
of the analysis required by the more recent Supreme Court decisions is
particularly important for cases involving adjudications of support. In
other words, adjudications of support will be controlled principally by the
new foreseeability principles introduced in Shaffer v. Heftner and applied
in Kulko and World-Wide Volkswagen.
As Part B of this Article explains, the treatment of custody and termination litigation has bedeviled the courts at all levels. Probably as a result of
the fact that neither the teachings of Pennoyer nor the conceptual scheme
embodied in the InternationalShoe opinion (prior to its reformulation in
Shaffer v. Heitner) handled custody litigation easily, lower courts have
struggled with custody cases more than virtually any other species of domestic relations litigation. One result of the confusion has been the passage of uniform state legislation. With respect to custody litigation, federal
legislation must also be considered. Parts C and D of this Article consider
these problems in detail in the context of the legislation and Texas case
law.
C

The Notice Requirements of Due Process

The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide various techniques for service of process upon both residents and nonresidents of Texas. 86 The Texas
Family Code addresses the problem of which method of service is available in a family law case. 87 While compliance with the rules of procedure
and their statutory counterparts is required, compliance with the notice
requirements of due process is also necessary.
The central case on this subject is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.88 The case involved the notification by publication of certain
beneficiaries to a trust fund. The publication was in accordance with the
minimum requirements of New York banking laws, which permitted publication in a local newspaper. The trustee of the trust fund had instituted
the action to settle the rights of the beneficiaries in the fund and to validate
the trustee's handling of it. The method of notice by publication was challenged by a special guardian appointed pursuant to New York law to protect the beneficiaries' interests.
The guardian argued that the New York court was without power to
adjudicate the interests of all persons residing outside New York. The
86. See, e.g., TEX. R. Civ. P. 102-17; see also 2 B. KAZEN,
TICE & PROCEDURE § 43 (1982).
87. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

88. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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guardian contended that the action was in personam rather than in rem
and that, under principles set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff, 8 9 the state was
without power to adjudicate beyond its borders. The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the basis that the requirements of the fourteenth
amendment do not depend upon whether judicial proceedings to settle
fiduciary accounts are termed in rem, quasi in rem, or in the nature of
proceedings in rem. The Court concluded: "[t]he interest of each state in
providing means to close trusts that exist by grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in
custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the
In other words, the Supreme Court efinterests of all claimants .. "..",90
fectively bypassed the opportunity to reconsider the in rem wing of
Pennoyer.
The Court next considered the adequacy of the notice given the beneficiaries. It identified the beneficiaries' interest in effective notice and the
state's interest in a practical means of complying with the notice requirements. The Court articulated the general principles of fourteenth amendment notice requirements:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections . . . . The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information. . . and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. . . . But
if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case
these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements
are satisfied. 9'
In considering the subject of citation by publication, the Supreme Court
concluded that as a general proposition, publication was not a "reliable
means of acquainting interested parties" of the litigation. 92 At least in the
context of missing or unknown persons, however, the Court said it had not
hesitated to approve publication as being the only practical means. In
short, publication is appropriate when it is the only practical means under
the circumstances. In the circumstances of a common trust involving great
numbers of beneficiaries, "impracticable and extended searches are not required in the name of due process."'93 Consequently, the Court held that
published notice is sufficient with respect to beneficiaries whose location or
interests are unknown to the trustee. But in other situations something
more than publication is required. For a person whose address is known,
the Court stated that the classic method is personal service. Mailed notice
to known beneficiaries is a constitutionally sufficient alternative, which the
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

95 U.S. 714 (1878); see supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
339 U.S. at 313.
Id at 314.
Id at 315.
Id at 317-18.
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Court considered reasonably calculated to reach the defendant while at the
same time not imposing a serious expense burden on the party who instituted the proceeding.
A similar approach was taken in Armstrong v. Manzo .94 After the parents were divorced and the wife remarried, the second husband attempted
to adopt the wife's daughter. At the time, Texas law provided that a stepparent adoption could be granted without the natural father's consent
when he had failed to contribute to the child's support to the extent of his
ability for two years. Consequently, no notice of the proceeding was given
to the father. The Supreme Court held that the most rudimentary demands of due process had not been met. 95 Moreover, the fact that the first
husband was afforded an opportunity to attack the trial court's determination on the question of support did not matter. The Armstrong opinion
reiterates the principles set forth in Mullane.
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide generally for two types of
service that do not involve the personal delivery of the citation to the defendant: citation by publication 9 6 and citation by registered or certified
mail, return receipt requested.97 Citation by publication has been properly
characterized as a sham upon due process. 98 As Mullane indicates, publication is such a miserable substitute for actual notice that whenever the
respondent's identity is known or may be ascertained by the exercise of
reasonable diligence, this method of service should be avoided by counsel
and discountenanced by the courts. 99
As a general proposition, service by registered or certified mail, return
receipt requested, is not subject to the same strong criticism. Consequently, the general rule with respect to mailed service is that there is no
constitutional requirement that the mailed notice actually be received.
Consider Texas Real Estate Commission v. Howard, °° in which a notice
letter was returned unclaimed: "Where service of notice by registered mail
is expressly authorized by statute, service is effected when the notice is
properly stamped, addressed, registered and mailed."'' °
94. 380 U.S. 545 (1965).

95. Id at 552.
96. TEx. R. Civ. P. 106, 109a.
97. Id. 109; see also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b(5) (1964).
98. Johnson, supra note 9.
99. In Sgitcovich v. Sgitcovich, 150 Tex. 398, 405, 241 S.W.2d 142, 146 (1951), the Texas
dispense with personal service, the substitute that is most
Supreme Court stated that "[tlo
likely to reach the defendant is the least that ought to be required if substantial justice is to
be done." See also Wiebusch v. Weibusch, 636 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1982, no writ); Forney v. Jorrie, 511 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974,

writ refd n.r.e.) (when substituted service under rule 106 is available, publication is not
appropriate).
100. 538 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
101. Id at 433.
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DISSOLUTION PROCEEDINGS AND THE TEXAS FAMILY CODE

A.

Civil Status, Personal Jurisdiction, and Divisible Divorce

A divorce case typically involves questions other than the mere dissolution of the marital relationship. A dissolution of the marital relationship
under traditional civil status rules may be based on the domicile of one
spouse in the state that granted the divorce, even when there is no personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident spouse. Domicile of the resident spouse,
however, has not generally been considered a jurisdictional basis for altering the rights of spouses as to property, alimony, or conservatorship so as
to bind both parties.
In order to satisfy the legitimate interest of the state in which a domiciliary sought a divorce against a nonresident, the concept of divisible divorce
was created as a working compromise. Under this concept, when a court
cannot adjudicate all issues that arise in the context of a matrimonial dissolution proceeding because domicile of the resident spouse is not sufficient as a jurisdictional foundation, it may still render an enforceable
divorce decree. Resolution of the other matters is left to litigation in jurisdictions where jurisdiction exists.' 0 2 As a practical matter, divisible divorce means that all aspects of a dissolution proceeding are entitled to full
faith and credit only when other requirements are satisfied. 0 3 These other
requirements depend upon the particular aspect of the dissolution proceeding under consideration. For example, personal jurisdiction is required for support decrees and the division of matrimonial property
located outside Texas. Property located in Texas is also subject to the due
process fairness analysis involving the relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation. The presence of the property in Texas, however, will ordinarily give rise to the presumption that Texas is an appropri-4
ate forum for the determination of ownership interests in the property.'00 5
An additional set of requirements has been devised for foreign realty.
Finally, custody and termination cases have undergone a complex series of
that are considered in detail in a later section of this
developments
06
Article. 1
B. The Marital Long-Arm Provisions
Situational Requirements

I.

A Texas court may acquire personal jurisdiction over a spouse who is
102. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 419 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549
(1948).
103. See Sampson, Jurisdiction in Divorce and Conservatorship Suits, 8 TEX. TECH L.

159, 163 (1976): "Thus, personal jurisdiction over both parties is the touchstone for
effective resolution of all issues arising upon divorce. Given the nature of today's society,
the divisible divorce concept and the resultant impotence of the courts involved often lead to
hardship and inequity."
104. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 125-29.
106. See infra Part A, III.
REV.
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not a Texas resident or domiciliary by invoking the court's long-arm jurisdiction. Section 3.26 of the Texas Family Code provides that if the petitioner is a Texas resident or domiciliary at the commencement of the suit
for divorce, the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondent or the respondent's personal representative if: (1) Texas is the last
state in which marital cohabitation between the parties occurred, and the
suit is commenced within two years after the date on which cohabitation
ended; or (2) there is any basis consistent with the Constitution0 of
Texas or
7
of the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Satisfaction of the situational requirements of this long-arm statutory
provision are necessary when a resident spouse seeks dissolution of the
marital relationship and division of matrimonial property of the type requiring the maintenance of personal jurisdiction. Moreover, as a result of
Shaffer v. Heitner, the presence of the property would not itself be a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse, but it would be unusual for the state where the property is located not to have jurisdiction,
08
unless the property was atypically removed to Texas from another state.
2. Case Law Construction
The first situational requirement of section 3.26 was construed in Scott v.
Scott. 0 9 Stephen and Catherine Scott were married in California. They
subsequently moved to Texas where they lived together as a family unit
for approximately four months. When they separated, Mrs. Scott returned
to California. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Scott filed suit for divorce in Texas
and sought a division of community property."10 Mrs. Scott was served
with process in California. Although the first divorce proceeding instituted
by Mr. Scott was dismissed because he had not satisfied the residency requirements of the Texas Family Code at the time of filing, I' he instituted
a subsequent proceeding. After Mrs. Scott was again served in California,
she made a special appearance to present a motion to the jurisdiction and a
plea in abatement. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's overruling of the special appearance.112
The appellate court concluded that since the parties' marital cohabitation from November 22, 1975, until their separation in February 1976
made Texas the "last state in which marital cohabitation between petitioner and respondent occurred," and the suit was "commenced within two
years after the date on which cohabitation ended," the situational requirements of section 3.26(a)(1) were clearly satisfied. The only remaining
107. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
108. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
109. 554 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ).
110. Id at 275. Scott also sought custody of a child.
Ill. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (Vernon 1975): "No suit for divorce may be
maintained unless at the time suit is filed the petitioner or the respondent has been a domiciliary of this state for the preceding six-month period and a resident of the county in which
the suit is filed for the preceding ninety-day period." See also id §§ 3.22, 3.23.
112. 554 S.W.2d at 278.

19831

FAMILY LAW LITIGATION

1107

question was whether the maintenance of the action comported with the
minimum contacts concept and traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In concluding that the trial court did not commit reversible error in overruling the special appearance, the appellate court
primarily focused upon the fact that Mrs. Scott presented no evidence
binding on Mr. Scott or the trial court that she did not have the requisite
minimum contacts with Texas. Since the agreed statement of facts reflected that the parties resided in Texas for two and one-half months prior
to separation, the appellate court concluded that Mrs. Scott failed to carry
her burden of showing that she was not amenable to process. In Fox v.
Fox"13 the Austin court of civil appeals, without expressly construing the
second situational requirement of section 3.26, determined that there was
no basis consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 14 While serving in the
army and stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, Mr. Fox brought suit for divorce
against Mrs. Fox, an Ohio resident. Mrs. Fox was served with personal
notice, but failed to appear. The trial court rendered a decree appointing
her managing conservator, setting child support, and dividing matrimonial
property, some of which was located in Ohio. Mrs. Fox made what she
termed a special appearance after the decree was rendered and prayed that
all aspects of the proceeding be set aside except the dissolution of the marital relationship. No one questioned the propriety of the special appearance after judgment. After a hearing, the trial court refused to reform the
judgment. The appellate court reversed because "[s]imply stated, petitioner [Mrs. Fox] did nothing in Texas and therefore, the district court
wrongfully asserted in personam jurisdiction over her." 15 Consequently,
the appellate court set aside the trial court's decree with respect to the conservatorship of the children and the division of property located outside
Texas.
Comisky v. Comisky 116 involved a similar situation. Benedict Comisky
filed suit for divorce in Dallas County. He alleged that he satisfied the
residential requirements of the Texas Family Code' '7 and that his wife
was a resident of New York. Among other things, Mr. Comisky sought a
division of property not located within Texas. Mrs. Comisky was served
with process in Michigan. When she failed to appear, the trial court
granted the divorce, gave Mr. Comisky managing conservatorship of the
children, and granted a division of the property located outside Texas.
Mrs. Comisky filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court overruled.
Mrs. Comisky then appealed by writ of error. The judgment of the trial
court was reversed except for the granting of the divorce. Two justices
concluded that the required conditions for the exercise of long-arm juris113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
Texas).

Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
Id at 409.
Id.
597 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.23 (Vernon 1975) (military personnel stationed in

1108

SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

diction were not alleged. Consequently, the record reflected error, because
the invalidity of the judgment was disclosed by the filed papers. All
agreed that the writ of error appeal constituted a general appearance re8
quiring a remand to the trial court for trial on the merits."i
The "last state of marital cohabitation" basis for personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident is an extremely crude test. Given the concept of divisible divorce and the special rules governing suits affecting the parent-child
relationship,' 19 what is really at issue is whether a division of matrimonial
property should be made in addition to the granting of the divorce. When
the property is situated in the jurisdiction where the divorce proceeding
has been instituted, the analysis set forth in Shaffer v. Heitner addresses the
problem directly. When the property is not located within the territory of
the forum, the analysis should turn upon whether it was removed from the
jurisdiction in which the divorce proceeding is instituted, whether the parties acquired the property while residing together as a family in the forum
state, and whether the nonresident spouse is a resident of the state in which
the property is located. Since special rules are applicable to real property,
the issue will typically focus upon personal property removed from the
state of matrimonial domicile by a spouse who has left the state upon separation. When is it fair and reasonable to require the spouse who left the
state of matrimonial domicile to submit to jurisdiction concerning an ownership interest in the property that was taken? This question, not the question of whether the forum state was the last state of marital cohabitation, is
the important one. In other words, a determination that Texas was the last
state of marital cohabitation and that the suit was commenced within two
years after the cohabitation ended is only a starting point.
3. Additional Requirementsfor Child Custody or Support
Section 3.26(b) of the Texas Family Code provides: "A court acquiring
jurisdiction under this section also acquires jurisdiction in a suit affecting
the parent-child relation if Section 11.051 of this code is applicable."'' 20
Professor Sampson indicated that section 3.26(b) is merely a cross-reference to the parent-child long-arm provision and "does not provide additional substantive rights."' 2' In other words, a Texas court's exercise of
jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse by way of division of matrimonial
property located outside Texas does not mean that it has jurisdiction to
determine questions of conservatorship and support. One Texas court discussed the matter in the following terms:
118. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 123:

Where the judgment is reversed on appeal or writ of error for the want of
service, or because of defective service of process, no new citation shall be
issued or served, but the defendant shall be presumed to have entered his appearance to the term of the court at which the mandate shall be filed.
See also McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965); Huggins v. Kinsey, 414 S.W.2d
208 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967, writ ref'd), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1968).
119. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text; infra Part A, Il1.
120. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
121. Sampson, supra note 103, at 199.
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In a divorce case where jurisdiction over the non-resident spouse is
properly based and established under Section 3.26, and if the factual
proof for reliance on Section 11.051 is shown to satisfy the requirements under one of the subdivisions to Section 11.051, then separate
proof of minimum contacts is not required for the court to exercise
jurisdiction over that part of the suit affecting the parent-child relationship. If the suit is not for divorce under Section 3.26, but is only a
suit affecting the parent-child relationship under Section 11.05 1, then
proof establishing one of the subdivision requirements of 11.051 is not
dispositive, but requires additional proof122of minimum contacts in order to satisfy due process requirements.
This conclusion approaches personal jurisdiction as a lump concept and
may be inappropriate. 23 For example, does the fact that matrimonial
property is located in Texas necessarily indicate that a trial court appropriately can make a support or custody order against a nonresident spouse
who has resided with the child in Texas? This all-or-nothing approach is
not sensible in light of the complexity of the problem. Each issue should
be considered separately:
(1) Is it fair and reasonable for the forum to exercise jurisdiction to
dissolve the matrimonial relationship?
(2) Is it fair and reasonable for the forum to exercise jurisdiction to
make a support order imposing a personal liability upon a nonresident?
(3) Is it fair and reasonable for the forum to exercise jurisdiction to
order a division of matrimonial property binding upon a nonresident
spouse?
(4) Is it fair and reasonable for the forum to exercise jurisdiction to
make a custody determination under the circumstances of the parties, including the child?
(5) Is it fair and reasonable for the forum to exercise jurisdiction to
make a termination decree under the circumstances of the parties, including the child?
While a "yes" answer to one issue may have an impact on answers to the
others, each issue should still be considered separately. Moreover, a Texas
decree in which a child custody determination is made probably will not
be accorded full faith and credit unless it is made consistently with the
24
Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA).1
122. Butler v. Butler, 577 S.W.2d 501, 506-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ
dism'd).
123. See Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 323 n.6 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no
writ):
For the concept of "partial personal jurisdiction," cf.Sampson, Jurisdiction
in Divorce and Conservatorship Suits, 8 Texas Tech. L.Rev. 159, 205 (1976);
Weintraub, Texas Long-Arm Jurisdictionin Family Law Cases, 32 Sw.L.J. 965,
981 (1978). See also Tex.R.Civ.P. 120a, which provides, "A special appearance may be made to an entire proceeding or as to any severable claim involved therein."
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980).
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The Foreign Realty Problem

The traditional rule is that foreign realty is not subject to direct division
in a Texas court in connection with or after a divorce. 25 On the other
hand, Texas courts have indirectly taken jurisdiction by ordering one of
the parties to make a conveyance to the other. While Texas courts have
generally concluded that a court cannot directly divest title to real property
located in another jurisdiction, when the court has personal jurisdiction
over a party, the court may order that party to execute a conveyance of
26
real estate located in another state.
In Estrabrook v. Wise' 27 a Texas court of civil appeals held that the trial
court had jurisdiction to require a former husband to execute conveyances
necessary to vest title to one-half of his interest in foreign realty because
the court had in personam jurisdiction. Subsequently, the Texas Supreme
Court granted a writ of error on this issue. The case was dismissed as
moot at the parties' request, however, after they decided to litigate in the
state where the realty was located.'2 8 Additionally, in making an equitable
division of the parties' estate, a Texas court may consider the value of real
29
property located outside Texas when dividing other property. 1
III.

SUITS AFFECTING THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP AND THE

TEXAS FAMILY CODE

A.
1.

TraditionalTreatment of Suits Affecting ParentalRights: Custody,
Visitation, and Termination
The Quasi In Rem (Civil Status) Approach

Cases concerning conservatorship, visitation, and the termination or establishment of parental rights are difficult to analyze in terms of the in
personam, quasi in rem, or in rem categories.' 30 Suits affecting the parentchild relationship concern the welfare, care, education, and best interests
of children. Analogies to actions concerning ownership interests in real or
personal property are only minimally useful. Analogies to commercial litigation between business interests are even less pertinent. Yet, the applica125. Deger v. Deger, 526 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ); Kaherl
v. Kaherl, 357 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, no writ).
126. See Hedley v. duPont, 558 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1977), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 570 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1978), on remand, 580
S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McKnight, Division of Texas MaritalProperty on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413, 449, 469-70, 483 (1976).

Professor McKnight considers Texas practice an aberration.
127. 506 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler), dism'dby agreement, 519 S.W.2d 632 (Tex.
1974).
128. 519 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1974). Since other jurisdictions are not likely to apply Texas

rules of equitable division or Texas rules of partition of post-divorce property under tenancy
in common ideas, the Texas practice of refusing to divide foreign realty directly is an aberration that creates problems. See Estabrook v. Wise, 348 So. 2d 355, 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978).
129. See, e.g., Walker v. Walker, 231 S.W.2d 905, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1950,
no writ).
130. See supra Part A, I.
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tion of the traditional scheme required courts to decide whether the action
was in rem or in personam. Since the custody of children may be viewed
as a status or relationship in which the state has an interest,' 3' application
of the rules used traditionally to justify the exercise of jurisdiction in actions involving the dissolution of the matrimonial relationship is tempting.
The original Restatement of Conflict of Laws adopted this facially simplistic approach. The question of custody was regarded simply as one of status and as such was subject to the control of the courts of the state where
the child was domiciled.1 32 Thereafter, several courts recognized that the
problem was more difficult. In Sampsell v. Superior Court 133 Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court summarized the theories that had
been advanced concerning the correct basis for jurisdiction. No question
of personal jurisdiction was presented because the defendant had submitted herself to the court's jurisdiction by answering the plaintiffs complaint
on the merits. 4 Hence, Justice Traynor's opinion indicates that the summarized theories provide the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. 35 One
theory provides that jurisdiction in personam over the children's parents is
sufficient. A second theory requires the child to be physically present
within the forum state, because a court located in a position of access to
the child is most qualified. The third theory is the domicile theory of the
original Restatement. 136 Justice Traynor basically concluded that since it
is in the interest of the child for some court to have jurisdiction, a flexible
approach to the problem is required. Aside from the listing of the various
approaches taken by other courts, Justice Traynor actually avoided the difficult questions of personal jurisdiction and enforceability of a custody decree in a sister state.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws follows the majority opinion in Sampsell. It adopts three alternative grounds of judicial jurisdiction: (1) domicile of the child; (2) physical presence of the child; or
(3) personal jurisdiction over the parents. 37 A comment to the Restatesuit if
ment (Second) provides that the court may decline to entertain the
38
the court concludes that the best interest of the child requires it.'
131. See Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 144, 112 S.W.2d 165, 168 (1938); Perry v.
Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
132. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 117, 145 (1934).
133. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
134. 197 P.2d at 746.
135. Id. at 746-48. A few Texas court opinions also view the matter as a subject matter
jurisdiction question. See, e.g., Oliver v. Boutwell, 601 S.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1980, no writ); Thornlow v. Thomlow, 576 S.W.2d 697, 700-01 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ dism'd w.o.j.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980); Hilt v.
Kirkpatrick, 538 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ). This approach
does not, however, resolve the personal jurisdiction problem.
136. 197 P.2d at 746-48.
137.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971).

138. Id comment.
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2. The PersonalJurisdictionApproach
In a much maligned opinion, May v. Anderson, 139 the United States
Supreme Court considered the question of whether personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident parent is required in the making of a child custody
decree. In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Burton, this matter was
given the following treatment:
[W]e have before us the elemental question whether a court of a state,
where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor present, may cut off
her immediate right to the care, custody, management and companionship of her minor children without having jurisdiction over her in
personam. Rights far more precious to appellant than property rights
will be cut off if she is bound by the Wisconsin award of custody.
. . .We find it unnecessary to determine the children's legal domicile because, even if it be with their father, [in Wisconsin], that does
not give Wisconsin, certainly as against Ohio, the personal jurisdictheir mother of her personal
tion that it must have in order to deprive
140
right to their immediate possession.
Although Justice Burton did not mention the due process clause, his opinion could be read as authority for the proposition that a decree adjudicating custody must be based on personal service in the forum state or the
equivalent minimum contacts on the part of the nonresident parent. 14
Despite the fact that Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion did not
plurality opinadopt this method of reasoning, for a time Justice Burton's
142
ion received acceptance as authoritative in Texas.
3. Continuing Jurisdictionin the Interstate Context
Texas courts have recognized the concept of continuing jurisdiction for
suits affecting the parent-child relationship. Section 11.05 of the Texas
Family Code 14 3 provides that when a court acquires jurisdiction of a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship, jurisdiction is retained for all matters concerning the custody and support of the child. Generally, the court
of continuing jurisdiction has continuing exclusive jurisdiction. Texas
courts have now held that section 11.05 refers only to courts within the
139. 345 U.S. 528 (1953). The plurality opinion did not consider the best interests of the
children. For this and other reasons, the case has received unceasing criticism. See H.
CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 326 (1968) ("In short,
the case .. .is an aberration ....");see also Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to
Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REV. 379 (1959).
140. 345 U.S. at 533-34.
141. See Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
See generally Hazard, supra note 139, at 383.
142. See Spitzmiller v. Spitzmiller, 429 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1968, writ ref d n.r.e.); cf. Sampson, supra note 103, at 209 n.148: "It is preferable to
avoid the May rule by extending the personal jurisdiction over absent parents, i.e., the Texas
approach." But cf. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 133 (1971).
143. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05 (Vernon 1975).
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State of Texas and therefore has no extraterritorial application. 44 In so
holding, the Dallas court of civil appeals in Crockett v. Crockett expressly
disapproved
the views expressed by two other intermediate appellate
45
courts. 1

In Crockett suit was instituted in Texas against a nonresident father who
146
had failed to pay child support as ordered by an Ohio divorce decree.
The father appeared specially and argued that the Ohio court had continuing exclusive jurisdiction based on section 11.05. This contention was rejected by the Dallas court of civil appeals. The court might possibly have
concluded that both the Texas and Ohio courts had jurisdiction to enforce
the Ohio decree. Under these circumstances, however, precluding enforcement in Texas by the application of a principle inserted in the Family
internal confficts among Texas
Code for the apparent purpose of avoiding
47
trial courts would not be sensible.
Less than one year after the Crockett decision, a different panel of the
Dallas court of civil appeals decided Oliver v. Boutwell.148 The precise
posture of that case involved the attempted modification of a conservatorship order rendered in Texas. The nonresident respondent, who had been
gone from Texas for more than a year, was held subject to jurisdiction
pursuant to section 11.051 and the requirements of due process. While the
phrase "continuing jurisdiction" is not used in the part of the opinion entitled "In Personam Jurisdiction," the opinion clearly indicates that the
existence of the prior Texas decree was a central factor in the determina49
tion that the Texas court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.'
Under the heading "Subject-Matter Jurisdiction," the opinion states that
in passing section 11.05, the legislature granted Texas courts continuing
subject matter jurisdiction to modify their conservatorship decrees with respect to nonresident children. 150 The Boutwell opinion concludes by recin
ognizing that the Texas Legislature's enactment of section 11.052
52
197915 imposed limits upon the exercise of continuing jurisdiction.
144. Gunter v. Glasgow, 608 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ);
Crockett v. Crockett, 589 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
145. See Brown v. Brown, 555 S.W.2d 784, 786-87 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no
writ); Follak v. Brown, 530 S.W.2d 882, 883-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
146. 589 S.W.2d at 760. The petitioner filed suit to hold the respondent in contempt of
the Ohio decree, to recover alleged arrearages in child support, and to modify the provisions
of the decree relating to child support and visitation.
147. The principal purpose of the concept in the intrastate context is to make certain that
a court rendering an order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship is aware of prior
litigation concerning the child. See id. at 763.
'148. 601 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
149. Id at 395-96 ("Appellee's custody of her child, as well as appellant's access to his
child, is defined by the terms of a Texas decree.").
150. Id at 398. "Section 11.05 was enacted against a background of cases holding that"
the child who was the subject of the conservatorship proceeding had to be a resident of
Texas or present within Texas. Id (citing Exparte Birmingham, 150 Tex. 595, 244 S.W.2d
977 (1952)).
151. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.052 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
152. 601 S.W.2d at 398.
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The opinion of a Houston court of civil appears in Kelly v. Novak15 3
further muddied the waters. The parties were divorced in November 1978
by a Texas court. The mother was appointed managing conservator of a
minor child, and the father was afforded liberal visitation rights. Subsequently, in April 1979, the mother remarried and moved out of Texas,
apparently to the State of Washington. Richard Novak, her former
spouse, filed a motion to modify on October 1, 1979. Since Mrs. Kelly
defaulted, the trial court awarded Mr. Novak materially better visitation
provisions. This decree was entered on December 14, 1979. A motion to
set aside the judgment was filed, heard, and denied before
thirty days had
154
expired from the entry of the December 14th order.
On the subject of continuing jurisdiction, the appellate opinion states:
"Section 11.052 . . . prohibits a court from exercising its continuing jurisdiction if the managing conservator and the child have been residents of
155
another state for more than six months before the action was filed."'
Reasoning from the enactment of section 11.052, the court of civil appeals
concluded that the legislature recognizes the concept in the interstate context. Citing Oliver v. Boutwell, the court stated: "While there is a conflict
in Texas authority on the subject of extra-territorial application of continuing jurisdiction, we conclude that continuing jurisdiction can confer in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant so long as the defendant
15 6
is provided with notice and opportunity to be heard."'
Several consequences follow from identification of the concept of continuing jurisdiction as a subject matter jurisdiction principle. Decrees rendered by courts having no jurisdiction over the subject matter are
considered void and subject to collateral attack.' 57 The traditional rule is
that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or conferred by agreement. These principles may be out of place in the context of the interstate
application of continuing jurisdiction.
Similarly, when the concept of continuing jurisdiction is singled out as a
separate doctrine accompanying the principles of in personam jurisdiction,
which themselves depend upon the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation, the concept takes on an importance that is out of
proportion. The real issue should be whether it is fair and reasonable for
the jurisdiction to continue. This determination will depend upon the nature of the subsequent proceeding and upon the relationship of the nonresident to the forum. The existence of a prior decree is an added factor and
should not be elevated to doctrinal levels. Both the Uniform Child Cus153.
154.
expires
trial or
155.
156.

606 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1980, no writ).
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b. A trial court's plenary power to vacate a final judgmeht
30 days after a written draft of the final order is signed, if no timely motion for new
motion to modify the final order is filed.
606 S.W.2d at 29.
Id.

157. See 4 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 100.09[1] (1982); Hodges, Collat-

eralAttacks on Judgments, 41 TEX. L. REV. 163, 164 (1962); see also McEwen v. Harrison,
162 Tex. 125, 128, 345 S.W.2d 706, 710 (1961); Faglie v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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tody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnaping Prevention
Act of 1980, however, rely on the concept of continuing
jurisdiction in the
58
context of interstate child custody determinations.1
B.
1

The Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship Long-Arm Provision
In General

The principal statutory section under which a nonresident may be subjected to jurisdiction in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship is
Texas Family Code section 11.051.159 It provides that when the respondent is not a Texas resident or domiciliary, a court may acquire in personam jurisdiction pursuant to a special long-arm statute if:
(1) the child was conceived in [Texas] and the person on whom service
is required is a parent or an alleged or probable father of the child;
(2) the child resides in [Texas] as a result of the acts or directives or
with the approval of the person on whom service is required; (3) the
[respondent] has resided with the child in this state; or (4) . . .there is
any basis consistent with the constitutions of [Texas]
or the United
60
States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.1
The passage of the statute was prompted by the opinion of the Texas
Supreme Court in Mitchim v. Mitchim,'16 1 in which the court recognized
"that the minimum contacts concept of in personam jurisdiction is peculiarly suited to matrimonial support cases."' 162 The court in Mitchim identified two prerequisites to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident respondent: (1) a statute that authorizes the service of citation
or other form of due process notice upon the nonresident; and (2) satisfaction of the constitutional requirement that the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation satisfy the fairness test of Shaffer v.
Heitner.163 Texas had a general long-arm statute 6 at the time the Mitchim case was decided. Since the general statute was drafted principally to
deal with standard tort and contract litigation, some believed that a statute
specially suited to family law matters was required. Similarly, at the time
of the Mitchim decision, a rule of civil procedure provided for the service
165
of nonresident notice upon a defendant who was not a Texas resident.
The rule now explicitly provides:
A defendant served with such notice shall be required to appear and
answer in the same manner and time and under the same penalties as
158. See Sampson, What's Wrong with the UCCJA?, FAM. ADVOC.,Spring 1981, at 28,
30-31.
159. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
160. Id Although § 11.051 is a more specialized statute than the California provision
criticized in Kulko, it does contain a broad catchall category that may be subject to the same
criticism in terms of its notice giving character.
161. 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975).
162. Id at 365.
163. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Since Mitchim was decided before Shaffer, the opinion does

not speak in precisely these terms.
164. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982-1983).
165.

TEx R. Civ P 108_
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if he had been personally served with a citation within this State to the
full extent that he may be requiredto appearand answer under the Constitution of the United States in an action either in rem or in
personam. 166
Despite the literal wording of the rule, some scholars doubted that it
could be used to subject a nonresident to the jurisdiction of a Texas court
on the theory that amending the "substantive law" by rule was beyond the
power of the Texas Supreme Court. 167 Prior to amendment of the rule,
case authority concluded that the rule was not applicable to actions other
than litigation involving domiciliaries who were temporarily absent from
Texas or proceedings properly classifiable as in rem or quasi in rem under
the conceptual scheme discussed in Pennoyer v. Neff. 16 8 Consequently, a
special jurisdictional statute was proposed by a group of notable scholars 169 and passed by the Texas Legislature.
The first situation described in section 11.051 as appropriate for the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction is conception of a child in Texas when the
nonresident respondent is "a parent" 70 or "an alleged father." ' 7' The theory is apparently analogous to the commission of a tort by the nonresident
in Texas. It is not quite based on a tortious conduct thesis, however, because conception alone is sufficient under the literal terms of the statute.
On the other hand, the argument has been convincingly made that situations will arise in which the mere conception of the child in Texas is not a
sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in the absence of other
72
factors. 1
The second situation is also analogous to a tort law long-arm rationale.
Basing jurisdiction upon the presence of the child in Texas with the approval of the person on whom service is directed or upon the acts or directives of the nonresident, is roughly similar to exercising jurisdiction over a
nonresident manufacturer who places into the stream of commerce defective goods that ultimately come to Texas and cause injury. 17 3 Kulko v.
Superior Court casts substantial doubt upon the literal sufficiency of this
section 11.051 subsection in child support cases. 174 Custody litigation in166. Id (emphasis added). The supreme court added the emphasized portion of the rule
effective Jan. 1, 1976.
167. See Baade, Rule 108: A Dissent, 38 TEX. B.J. 988, 988 (1975). "I submit that this
amendment is an impermissible extension of the Texas long-arm statute[s]. The rule-making power of the Supreme Court of Texas may only be used for the establishment of rules
'not inconsistent with the laws of this State'." Id (quoting TEX. CONST. art. V, § 25).
168. See, e.g., Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Evans Advertising Agency, Inc.,
450 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
169. The text of § 11.051 was discussed or drafted by Professors Russell Weintraub, John
J. Sampson, Eugene Smith, and Hans Baade. See Sampson, supra note 103, at 188.
170. "'Parent' means the mother, a man as to whom the child is legitimate, or an adoptive mother or father, but does not include a parent as to whom the parent-child relationship
has been terminated." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.01(3) (Vernon 1975).
171. Id §§ 13.01-.43 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (determination of paternity).
172. Sampson, supra note 103, at 202.
173. See, e.g., Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1973);
Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 595-96 (5th Cir. 1969).
174. See supra notes 64-85 and accompanying text.
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volves more complex issues that are perhaps not controlled by the Kulko
analysis, which is at least partially based upon the assumption that a less
onerous but effective alternative, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (URESA), exists.
The third situation, basing jurisdiction over the nonresident respondent
upon a prior residence of the nonresident with the child in Texas, also
cannot be taken literally. It is obviously overbroad when considered in the
context of a wide range of hypothetical cases in which the connection with
Texas has been severed for some time and not reestablished by the
nonresident.
The fourth section provides little guidance because it does not specify
what other situations constitute sufficient bases under the United States
and Texas Constitutions for the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over nonresidents. Moreover, the factors a trial or an appellate court should use in
making the determination are not set forth in the last section.
In summary, when section 11.051 provides specific information, the information is frequently misleading. When it gives general guidance, the
guidance is too vague to be of assistance.
In 1979 the Texas Legislature added sections 11.045 ("Original Jurisdiction") and 11.052 ("Exceptions to Continuing Jurisdiction") to chapter 11
of the Texas Family 75
Code. These sections supplement section 11.051, but
do not supersede it.1
2.

Child Support Cases

In Zeisler v. Zeisler 176 the spouses obtained a Texas divorce in 1971.
The court awarded the wife custody and ordered the husband to pay child
support. In 1972 the mother and child moved to Georgia. Thereafter, apparently in 1972 or 1973 the father moved to Florida. The father continued to make his support payments through the Dallas child support office
in accordance with the terms of the divorce decree. In 1976 the mother,
basing jurisdiction on section 11.051, brought a suit affecting the parentchild relationship against the nonresident father to secure an increase in
child support payments. These facts satisfy the situational requirements of
section 11.051 without difficulty; the trial court concluded, however, that
the father's special appearance should be sustained. On appeal, the Dallas
court of civil appeals reversed.
Considerations of convenience cannot be cited to support assumption
of personal jurisdiction here, but, on the other hand, no other forum is
shown to be more convenient for both parties. Moreover, since Texas
is the state of last matrimonial domicile, no other state has both a
superior interest and clear authority to enforce appellee's obligation to
support his child. . .
Since appellee's obligation to support the
175. The 1979 amendments bear a facial resemblance to the UCCJA. For an explanation of why this resemblance is misleading, see infra text accompanying notes 333-45. For
further discussion of the 1979 amendments, see infra text accompanying notes 403-20.
176. 553 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ dism'd).
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child arose in Texas and until now has been regulated and defined by
a Texas decree ordering him to make payments in Texas, we conclude
that requiring him to respond in Texas to a suit to increase the
amount of those payments does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."
. . . [T]he noncustodial parent should be subject to continuing personal jurisdiction of the state of last matrimonial domicile, at least as
order of that state requires support
long as a currently enforceable
177
payments to be made there.
The opinion of the appellate court clearly indicates that the father did not
assert a forum non conveniens plea. Also, the court of civil appeals apparently would have considered the matter differently if the parties had resided elsewhere as a family unit.
Zeisler is probably erroneous when considered in light of Shaffer,
Kulko, and World- Wide Volkswagen. The connection between the Zeislers and the forum had been severed for approximately four years. 178 The
relationship between the forum and the action for an increase in child support to be paid by a nonresident to a nonresident, who had not lived in
Texas for four years, was not such that Texas had any special interest in
granting relief. Moreover, what could Mr. Zeisler have done to structure
his conduct to avoid litigation in Texas? Perhaps an action to enforce the
could be distinguished from the type of
Texas decree as initially rendered
79
relief requested in Zeisler. 1
Another case decided by the Dallas court of civil appeals distinguishes
Kulko on its facts and takes a very liberal view of the jurisdictional question. In Crockett v. Crockett' 80 the spouses married in Texas in 1963. Until 1966 they resided in Dallas where two children were conceived.
Thereafter, the couple and the children moved to Austin, Texas, and then
to Ohio. In 1974 the parents returned to Texas and announced that they
wanted a divorce. The mother stayed in Texas after the announcement,
while the father returned to Ohio and obtained an Ohio divorce. In 1977
the mother sued in Texas to hold the father in contempt of the Ohio decree, to recover alleged arrearages in child support, and to modify the provisions of the decree.' 8 ' After service, the father appeared specially and
the special appearance was sustained. On appeal, the court of civil appeals
found that Kulko did not control the outcome because: "(1) the parties
were married in Texas; (2) the parties lived for several years as man and
wife in Texas; (3) both children were conceived in Texas; (4) both children
were born in Texas; (5) the respondent resided with the children in Texas;"
(6) the children stayed in Texas with their mother after the divorce; and
177. Id at 930-31.
178. Id. at 928.
179. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.052 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), which contains exceptions to continuing jurisdiction and provides that the exceptions do "not affect the power
of the court to enforce and enter a judgment on its decree."
180. 589 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
181. Id at 759-60.
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(7) the father came to Texas to visit. The court of civil appeals also noted
that section 11.051 is a special jurisdictional statute, which demonstrates a
particularized and definite interest of Texas in adjudicating the family dis82
pute in its courts.'
Perry v. Ponder 83 involved issues of support and conservatorship. In
1978 an Alabama couple was divorced by an Alabama decree giving custody to the mother. In September 1978 the mother moved to Texas with
the child. The mother and child resided in Texas thereafter. In early 1979
the father obtained a modification decree from the Alabama divorce court,
granting him custody of the child. After service was attempted on the
mother, she filed a suit in Texas alleging that the Alabama modification
decree was void. She also sought an order from the Texas court that the
father should be ordered to make monthly child support payments. The
trial court sustained the father's special appearance in Texas based on lack
of sufficient contacts with Texas to support the exercise of jurisdiction.
With respect to the child support obligation, which the mother sought to
have the Texas court impose, the appellate court sustained the trial court's
judgment. Despite the fact that the mother and the child had resided in
Texas for a period of approximately ten months at the time the mother's
action was instituted, the Dallas court of civil appeals concluded that as to
the support issue, the case was controlled by Kulko.
Since the father had not directed or approved the mother's act in bringing the child to Texas, the situational requirements of subsection (2) of
section 11.051 were not satisfied. Hence, the only subsection of section
184
11.051 that could support the exercise of jurisdiction was the last one.
Apparently, the father had no contacts, ties, or relations with Texas, other
than the fact that his ex-wife and his child had moved to Texas. Unless
some form of negative conduct may suffice, such as the failure to make
support payments, the exercise of jurisdiction would offend due process.
Since the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act is as applicable
to the support issue in Perry as it was in Kulko, URESA, an alternative
that is less onerous to the father, probably satisfies the legitimate interest of
Texas with respect to the question of support. The more interesting question, however, is whether the matter of conservatorship is viewed
differently.
3. ConservatorshipLitigation
Suits affecting the parent-child relationship include determinations of
both possessory and managing conservatorship. 85 Much of the litigation
concerning section 11.051 concerns custody determinations. In Corliss v.
182. Id. at 762.
183. 604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
184. See supra text accompanying note 160.
185. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.01(5) (Vernon 1975) provides: "'Suit affecting the parent-child relationship' means a suit brought under this subtitle in which the appointment of
a managing conservator or a possessory conservator, access to or support of a child, or establishment or termination of the parent-child relationship is sought."
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Smith 186 the litigants were divorced in Dallas County in 1972. Thereafter,
the mother left the state in November 1972. In December 1976 the father
filed his petition seeking what amounted to a request for divided custody.
The children had resided with their mother in Nebraska during the fouryear period between the date she and the children left Texas and the filing
of the father's petition. With the exception of one time in 1974, the father
did not visit, see, or communicate with his children during this interval.
Under these circumstances, the appellate court held that requiring the wife
to come into Texas and defend the action would not be fair or equitable.
Corliss is principally interesting for the guidance it gives for other fact
situations. The opinion establishes a six-month absence rule after which
"a presumption arises that the Texas courts no longer constitute convenient and/or competent forums." 187 In addition, the opinion indicates that
a Texas court should attempt to determine whether full faith and credit
will be given the Texas decree in the state where enforcement will be
88
necessary. 1
The reasoning enunciated in Corliss was followed by the San Antonio
court of civil appeals in Oubre v. Oubre. 189 The parties had been inhabitants of Bexar County where their child was born. In June 1975 they were
divorced in Bexar County. Mrs. Oubre was made managing conservator.
After the divorce, both continued to reside in Bexar County, where child
support was paid and custody and visitation rights were exercised. Mrs.
Oubre moved to Florida in January 1978, shortly before the father filed a
motion to modify by changing custody or enlarging his visitation rights.
Since the mother and child were gone less than one month, Oubre
presented a situation entirely different from Corliss.
In both Corliss and Oubre the courts of civil appeals concluded that the
ability of the forum state to reach a result that will conform to the child's
best interests is the paramount consideration in the jurisdictional analysis. 190 Ordinarily, the courts in the state of the child's domicile are in a
better position to determine the best interests of the child, since the evidence will most likely be better developed in that state. A related factor is
the availability and relative convenience of the parties and witnesses, who
usually include the parents, the child, domestic relations counselors, and
the child's teachers, doctors, ministers, and neighbors. Accordingly, when
the undisputed proof shows that the child and managing conservator have
resided outside Texas for six months or more before suit is filed, the presumption arises that the Texas courts are no longer convenient or competent forums to adjudicate claims affecting the parent-child relationship,
have lesser interests in protecting the welfare of the child than the foreign
186.
187.
188.
S.W.2d
189.
190.

560 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
Id.at 173.
A similar result was reached on somewhat similar facts in Miller v. Miller, 575
594 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ).
575 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
Id at 365.
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state, and are consequently unwarranted in asserting jurisdiction in the
absence of sufficient proof to overcome the presumption.
In Oliver v. Boutwell19 1 the issue was the jurisdiction of a Texas court to
modify a Texas custody decree with respect to a child and a parent who
had become nonresidents. After a 1975 divorce, the mother moved to Mississippi with the child in 1977. The move made the father's exercise of his
monthly visitation privilege difficult. Consequently, approximately thirteen months after the mother's move to Mississippi, he filed a motion to
modify the Texas decree by increasing his access from thirty hours per
month to approximately three months per year. The mother was served
and entered a special appearance. After the mother prevailed in the trial
court, the father appealed.
Since the situational facts of subdivisions (1) and (3) of section 11.051
were satisfied, the only question on appeal was whether due process was
offended. The court of civil appeals held that due process was not offended, because the child had been conceived and born in Texas, and the
mother exercised managing conservatorship under a Texas decree. The
opinion rejects the method of analysis used in Corliss. In strong terms, the
opinion states that the relative convenience of the parties and witnesses, a
balancing of the interests of Texas and a foreign state in maintaining the
litigation, the length of absence of the nonresident from Texas, and a consideration of whether the foreign state would afford the Texas decree full
faith and credit are not germane to the question of in personam jurisdiction under section 11.051.192 In short, Oliver rejects the six-month absence
rule and apparently concludes that a nonresident managing conservator
will have difficulty prevailing at a special appearance hearing in connection with proceedings instituted in Texas to modify a Texas decree when
the party seeking the modification decree takes a moderate position. For
example, if the husband's request had been considered as a request for
joint custody because of the duration of the increased period of visitation,
the six-month rule of Family Code section 11.052(d)(1) would change the
result obtained in the Oliver case. On the other hand, if the modification
motion is considered as not concerning the appointment of a managing
conservator, the problem becomes more difficult to resolve. Section
11.052(a)(2) provides that a Texas court may not exercise jurisdiction to
modify "any part of the decree if all of the parties and the child have
established and continue to maintain their principal residence outside this
state." 93 Section 11.052 apparently does not serve as a limitation on the
exercise of continuing jurisdiction for visitation questions when one of the
parties remains in Texas. This section, however, was not in effect when the
trial court ordered the dismissal of the Oliver case.194 The conclusion in
Oliver that convenience, the balancing of the interests of concerned states,
191. 601 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
192. Id at 397.
193. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.052(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
194. 601 S.W.2d at 398.
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and the length of absence are not relevant concerns is subject to strong
criticism. Indeed, these concerns are most relevant and frequently control
the due process analysis.
In Cossey v. Cossey' 95 the Waco court of civil appeals concluded that a
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to assume jurisdiction.
Mr. Cossey filed suit in September 1978 for divorce, property division, and
custody of the parties' two minor children. His petition contained jurisdictional allegations that satisfied the situational requirements of sections 3.26
and 11.051 of the Family Code.196 Mrs. Cossey filed a special appearance
motion "for the reason the Respondent and her children are residents of
the State of Louisiana and were so domiciled at the time of the filing of
Petitioner's Original Petition herein."' 97 At the hearing, the following
facts were developed: (1) for five years prior to December 1977 the parties
lived with the children in Waco, Texas; (2) Mrs. Cossey moved to Louisiana in December 1977, but she left the children in Texas with their father;
(3) the children visited their mother after she moved to Louisiana, and in
March 1978 the husband delivered the children and all their belongings to
Mrs. Cossey in Louisiana; (4) the children continued living in Louisiana
until June 1979; (5) in July 1978 Mrs. Cossey filed a petition in Louisiana
for legal separation, custody of the children, and division of community
property, and by temporary order, the Louisiana court granted Mrs. Cossey custody of the children on the date the petition was filed; (6) Mr. Cossey filed his Texas action in September 1978; (7) by May 1978 the parties
thought they had reached a settlement of all disputed matters under which
the Texas court would finalize the matrimonial litigation on an agreed basis; (8) at about this time, Mrs. Cossey left on a two-week trip to Europe,
during which time she agreed to let the children stay with their father on
the "express understanding that he would return the children to her upon
her return;"' 9 8 (9) when she returned, he declined to return the children,
but the sixteen-year-old male child returned to Louisiana of his own
accord.
In analyzing the factual background in the context of the Family Code's
situational requirements, the court of civil appeals first determined that
Texas was the last state of marital cohabitation and that the mother had
resided with the children in Texas. Hence, satisfying the literal language
of the Family Code's long-arm provisions presented no problem. The appellate court concluded, however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to proceed with any part of the case because the
question of divorce was not contested; most of the witnesses on the proper195. 602 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
196. He alleged that Texas was the last state of marital cohabitation between the parties
and that suit was filed within two years after the cohabitation ended. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 3.26(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). He also alleged that the respondent had resided in
Texas with the children. See id § 11.051(3).
197. 602 S.W.2d at 592.
198. Id at 595.
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ties to be divided "[were] likely [to] come from Louisiana;"' 199 the main
dispute between the parties was the custody of the children and the "witnesses on this issue [were] likely [to] come from Texas and Louisiana;" 2°°
and although the parents apparently overreached with the children, Mr.
Cossey did more overreaching. Perhaps the most significant factor concerning the question of custody was the fact that initially the father delivered the children voluntarily to Louisiana, and then he subsequently
violated his agreement to return them voluntarily after Mrs. Cossey returned from Europe.
In Cossey the court did not cite Corliss or any other family law precedent. Instead the court of civil appeals relied upon the last prong of the
O'Brien v. Lanpar20 formulation in reaching its conclusion that the lower
court made a sensible due process analysis of the matter. Equitable considerations favored Mrs. Cossey on the custody issue. The court also made
no mention of Family Code section 11.045, apparently because it was not
in effect on the date of the special appearance hearing. 20 2 Since the children had established a principal residence in Louisiana in March 1978 and
Mr. Cossey's suit was filed in Waco on September 11, 1978, neither Corliss
nor section 11.045 would apparently preclude the trial court from exercising original jurisdiction because not quite six months had passed.
Perry v. Ponder20 3 is a most significant Texas court opinion on the subject of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in domestic
relations litigation. It involved a relatively typical scenario. In June 1978
an Alabama couple divorced in Alabama. The court awarded custody to
the mother and she then moved with the child to Texas. After the father
obtained a change of custody in May 1979 from the Alabama court,2 4 the
mother instituted litigation in Texas to obtain a Texas decree making her
managing conservator. She also sought a child support order. The father
was served in Alabama with nonresident notice. 20 5 He then made a special
appearance in Texas. 2°6 At the special appearance hearing the testimony
reflected that, at most, the father knew about and acquiesced in the
mother's plans to move the child to Texas; the father testified that he did
not consent to the move. Based on this testimony, the trial court sustained
the special appearance and dismissed the litigation. On appeal, the mother
contended that the trial court had jurisdiction under both subdivisions (2)
and (4) of Family Code section 11.051.
The mother argued that "the court's ability to reach a result that would
promote the child's best interest" was paramount, particularly since the
child had resided in Texas for approximately ten months. Consequently,
199. Id. at 596.
200. Id.
201. See supra text accompanying note 54.
202. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.045 (effective June 13, 1979).
203. 604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
204. Id. at 311. Apparently, the Alabama modification decree was a default judgment.
205. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108.

206. Id 120a.
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Texas was the most convenient forum from the standpoint of witnesses
and the evidence. Moreover, the mother argued that Texas had an interest
in providing an effective means of redress for its resident. As a second
argument, the mother urged that the trial court should have exercised subject matter jurisdiction. 20 7 Predictably, the father cited Kulko 20 8 and argued that his contacts, ties, or relations with Texas were even more
attenuated than were Mr. Kulko's contacts with California. With respect
to the claim for support, the court of civil appeals concluded that the due
process requirements had not been satisfied. The main import of the opinion, however, involves its treatment of due process as applied to
conservatorship.
The first holding of the court on the custody issue was "that due process
permits adjudication of the custody of a child residing in the forum state
without a showing of 'minimum contacts' on the part of the nonresident
parent. ' 20 9 Second, with respect to due process, the court held:
[lI]f the [notice] requirements of due process and applicable procedural
rules are met, a Texas court has "personal jurisdiction" over the nonresident within subdivision (4) of Section 11.051 to adjudicate the custody issue, even though it may not have such jurisdiction to render a
personal judgment
enforcing or imposing affirmative duties on the
2 10
nonresident.
The court's third holding was that the court had no power to make a binding custody adjudication based on subject matter jurisdiction alone. 2 11
The position of the Dallas court of civil appeals that due process may be
satisfied in custody litigation without satisfaction of the minimum contacts
test rests on several bases. The court discussed the historical treatment of
the adjudication of status as an in rem proceeding. The status exception,
however, was discussed in modern terms. The court did not interpret the
footnote reference to status in Shaffer v. Heitner2 12 as a continuation of in
rem thought patterns. Instead, the focus was upon the forum's interest in
the litigation: "[A] family relationship may be among those matters concerning which the forum state may have such an interest that its courts
may reasonably make an adjudication affecting that relationship, even
though one of the parties to the relationship may have had no personal
contacts with the forum state. '2 13 For strong policy reasons, a nonresident
parent's lack of personal contacts does not "outweigh the state's vital interest in the welfare of children residing within its borders. ' 21 4 On the other
hand, when "the child and the parent seeking to invoke the court's powers
have only a tenuous relation with the forum state, the court may properly
decide that the best interest of the child requires it to defer to the courts of
207. 604 S.W.2d at 311-12.

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
604 S.W.2d at 313.
ld at 313-14.
Id at 314.
433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977); see supra notes 64-85 and accompanying text.
604 S.W.2d at 314.
Id at 316.
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another state having a more substantial interest and better access to relevant information. ' 21 5 The court also noted the existence of the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and articulated the premise that the principles of the UCCJA may be adopted by Texas courts to the extent that they
are consistent with Texas decisions.
After concluding that the factual circumstances of the case met the jurisdictional standards of the UCCJA in several respects, the court stated its
fourth holding:
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court should not have sustained
the father's special appearance and dismissed the suit for lack of contacts by him with the state of Texas, but should have inquired into the
circumstances of the parties and the child for the purpose of determining whether the child and the mother have been in Texas long enough
to give this state a sovereign's interest in and responsibility for the
child's welfare and to provide access to sufficient evidence to make an
informed decision concerning the child's best interests. If the court
determines on this basis that due process has been satisfied, the court
should then inquire as to whether the child's interests would be better
served2 16by an adjudication of custody by the courts of [another
state].
In its fifth holding the court found that although a court does not have
jurisdiction to render a personal judgment for support, it has jurisdiction
to bind a nonresident by a custody decree if he has had the notice and
opportunity to be heard required by due process, and if the court finds that
it is a proper forum to determine the best interests of the child. 21 7 Finally,
the court held that since section 11.051 was probably intended as an assertion of jurisdiction in the broadest sense consistent with due process, subdivision (4) of section 11.051 is to be interpreted as a statutory basis
a nonresident as
supporting the exercise of due process jurisdiction over
21 8
that matter is analyzed in the court's other holdings.
With respect to the 1979 amendments to the Texas Family Code, the
court of civil appeals first took the view that although sections 11.045,
11.052, and 11.053 are generally consistent with the reasoning used to eviscerate the plurality opinion in May v. Anderson, no exact correspondence
exists between the statutory sections and the rules of decision formulated
by the court on the issue of the extent of due process jurisdiction. Second,
the court tended to characterize sections 11.045 and 11.052 as subject matter jurisdiction provisions. This characterization presumably means that
any decree rendered under circumstances that violate the provisions is subject to collateral attack, that the statutory requirements cannot be waived,
and that whatever subdivision (4) of section 11.051 does in terms of conferring broad due process jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction principles
embodied in sections 11.045 and 11.052 serve as bulwarks limiting the ex215. Id. at 317.
216. Id. at 318.

217. Id at 322.

218. Id at 323.
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ercise of judicial power. Since a subject matter jurisdiction characterization appears to have been entirely unnecessary to the Perry result, perhaps
this reasoning will not survive in subsequent opinions. Third, the interpretation of subdivision (4) of section 11.051 as being sufficiently broad to
support the exercise of conservatorship jurisdiction in Perry accomplishes
what approximates adoption in Texas of sections 3 and 12 of the UCCJA
concerning the binding effect of original Texas custody decrees upon nonresidents. In this sense, Perry closes the gap between pure UCCJA jurisdictions and Texas law before the Perry decision.
Unfortunately, Perry has no writ history. Its holdings will not be examined by the Texas Supreme Court until another case with similar facts
arises. Whether the opinion will withstand attack cannot be predicted.
Perry may be vulnerable in its reliance upon the rephrasing of the personal jurisdiction test stated in Shaffer v. Heitner. The Shaffer opinion
emphasizes the relationship among the defendant, forum, and litigation.
Perry stretches the new formula to its breaking point.
4. Termination Litigation
Very little appellate litigation has involved the termination of parental
rights when the respondents are nonresidents of Texas. While a termination case is clearly a suit affecting the parent-child relationship,2 1 9 no definite answer exists to the question of whether due process requires personal
jurisdiction or whether notice and an opportunity to be heard are sufficient.220 In the Restatement (Second)of Conflict of Laws 2 2 termination is
categorized as a status determination not requiring personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident respondent. While this simplistic approach may be
subject to question in light of Shaffer 222 and Kulko,223 Shaffer's footnote
30 could support the conclusion that the old practice has not been superseded in termination cases.
At least one Texas case has attempted to address these questions. In In
re M SB. 224 a mother filed suit to terminate the parental rights of the nonresident father. The father and mother had been divorced in 1970 in West
Virginia. The West Virginia decree appointed the mother managing conservator of the child and ordered the father to make child support payments of sixty dollars per month. In 1977 the West Virginia court entered
an order modifying the father's visitation rights. On or about March 1,
1977, the mother and the children moved to Texas. On August 22, 1978,
the mother obtained a Texas decree that modified the 1970 West Virginia
decree by increasing the father's support payments. On August 22, 1979,
the mother, who had remarried, filed a termination proceeding. The father
219. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.01(5) (Vernon 1975).

220. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 69-79 (1971); see also Reese,
Marriagein American Conflict of Laws, 26 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 952,'953 (1977).
222. 433 U.S. 186 (1977); see supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
223. 436 U.S. 84 (1978); see supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
224. 611 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ).
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made a special appearance objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. The
trial court held that it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the suit.
Apparently, the only contact the father had with the State of Texas was
the move by his ex-spouse and children to Texas. Although a Texas court
ordered the father to pay child support, he did not appear in the prior
Texas proceeding to contest the modification of the West Virginia child
support decree. As a result, ascertaining the jurisdictional base upon
which the Texas support order rests is difficult. Moreover, nothing in the
opinion suggests that the father had violated the original West Virginia
decree or the subsequent Texas modification decree. Regardless of
whether he violated the original order or the Texas modification decree,
such a violation does not appear necessary to the result reached on the
jurisdictional issue.
In summary, the court of civil appeals held that the trial court erred in
dismissing the mother's suit because the termination proceeding was a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship. 225 Additionally, the factual situation fits within the provisions of Texas Family Code section 11.045226 because the State of Texas was the principal residence of the child at the time
the termination proceeding was commenced. In other words, the San
Antonio court of civil appeals treated section 11.045 as an affirmative grant
of jurisdiction that applies to all suits affecting the parent-child relationship.227 The court rejected the appellee's contention that the drastic character of a termination proceeding called for a different result from that
reached by the Dallas court of civil appeals in Perry v. Ponder.228 Viewing
the matter as a question of status, the San Antonio court had no difficulty
Shaffer. The court invoked footnote 30 and ended the
in distinguishing
229
matter.
While this result may ultimately be standard practice, the approach
taken by the San Antonio court misreads Shaffer and Perry. In Shaffer the
basic due process test is phrased in terms of the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation. While footnote 30 indicates that
"particularized rules governing adjudications of status" are not necessarily
inconsistent with the due process standards of fairness, an approach assuming that a litmus test can replace consideration of the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation is too simplistic. With
respect to Perry, the majority opinion does not interpret the references to
status in Shaffer as implying that status is a res supporting quasi in rem or
in rem jurisdiction. Rather, the forum's special'interest in affecting the
relationship of Texas residents to nonresidents through an adjudication
makes the state's exercise of judicial power reasonable, even though one of
the parties may have no significant personal contacts with the forum.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id at 706.
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § l l.045(a)(I)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
611 S.W.2d at 706.
Id
Id
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More significantly, perhaps, is the related conclusion that termination
cases should be analyzed in the same terms as custody cases. The majority
opinion in Perry contains no suggestion that this result is appropriate.
First, the court in Perry held that since May v. Anderson was not an obstacle, subdivision (4) of section 11.051 could be interpreted in light of the
policies of the UCCJA. 230 The UCCJA is not applicable to termination
proceedings. While the Perry opinion also refers to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and traditional concepts of status adjudication,
the entire discussion is in the context of custody litigation, not termination
of parental rights. 23' Section 11.045 of the Texas Family Code is broad
enough to encompass support litigation, custody litigation, and the termination of parental rights. The Perry court, however, explicitly recognized
that support litigation is subject to the due process analysis undertaken by
the United States Supreme Court in Kulko.232 Should termination cases
be analyzed like custody cases or like support cases? The stated basis for
distinguishing between support and custody cases in Perry is that a support
claim is like a claim for debt, which imposes a direct obligation to pay
money. 23 3 Custody decrees are characterized as largely negative, because
they reduce the rights of the nonresident, rather than increase the nonresident's obligations. While assimilating custody and termination on this basis is tempting, several other important reasons lead to a different
conclusion. First, termination, unlike custody, is final. It is a form of punishment imposed upon bad people. Viewed in this manner, the termination of parental rights can hardly be minimized, because the decree could
rationally be characterized as largely negative. Secondly, while the best
interest of the child is a paramount concern in both types of litigation,
termination proceedings frequently involve the competing interests and
antagonism of warring parents. When private parties institute termination
proceedings, an element of spite is frequently involved. Thirdly, the
United States Supreme Court has clearly indicated on numerous occasions
that parental rights are of constitutional proportions, especially in the context of termination litigation. Finally, a less onerous alternative is available when the best interest of the child warrants a modification of parental
rights. The less onerous alternative is the custody proceeding itself.
5. Interim Conclusion
Although Texas courts have done an admirable job in attempting to
deal with the Texas Family Code provisions concerning interstate conservatorship litigation, as the foregoing summary reflects, the current situation is far from satisfactory. Neither section 11.051 nor the 1979
amendments to the Texas Family Code serve to clarify sufficiently fundamental questions concerning when a Texas court may exercise jurisdiction
230.
231.
232.
233.

Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 322-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
Id at 313-16.
Id at 312-13.
Id
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to render an initial or a modification decree in a custody case. The principal lesson taught by the case law on these subjects is that anyone who is
involved in an interstate custody dispute must have an ample supply of
money to finance the jurisdictional controversies that are sure to precede
or supersede a consideration of the merits. As Parts C and D of this Article indicate, Texas should seriously consider the adoption of the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in order to eliminate at least some of the
complexity, confusion, and concomitant expense inherent in a nonuniform
approach to the problem.
PART

B.

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT, DUE PROCESS, AND FAMILY LAW
LITIGATION

I.

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND DUE PROCESS

A.

The Full Faith and Credit Doctrine

The Constitution of the United States provides: "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof. '' 234 With respect to judicial proceedings
in sister states, a federal statute provides that they "shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories
and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the'235
courts of such State,
Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
The full faith and credit doctrine was explained in Durfee v. Duke:
The constitutional command of full faith and credit, as implemented
by Congress, requires that "judicial proceedings . . .shall have the
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States...
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State .. .from
which they are taken." Full faith and credit thus generally requires
every State to give to a judgment at least the resjudicata effect which
236
the judgment would be accorded in the State which rendered it.
The full faith and credit clause and its statutory counterpart have been
applied rigorously in the enforcement of money judgments regardless of
the underlying cause of action. 237 Nevertheless, instances exist in which
the need for national uniformity 23 8 has been outweighed by the local policies of a forum state where enforcement is attempted. 239 As one state court
234. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
235. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
236. 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963).
237. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908) (judgment of sister state based on
gambling transaction constituting misdemeanor in forum state entitled to full faith and
credit); Rumpf v. Rumpf, 150 Tex. 475, 482, 242 S.W.2d 416, 420 (1951) (foreign alimony

decree entitled to full faith and credit despite fact that alimony is contrary to Texas public
policy).
238. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943).
239. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 546 (1935):

"It has often been recognized by this Court that there are some limitations upon the extent
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asserted: "In interpreting the full faith and credit clause, courts must reconcile the apparent simplicity of this statutory and constitutional language
with the complexity of interstate relations in a federal system. This reconciliation has been especially difficult in domestic relations cases in general
240
and in custody litigation in particular."
B. Limits on Full Faith and Credit.- Relationship to Due Process and
Other Defenses
Several bases are recognized for the refusal of a forum state to accord
full faith and credit to a judgment or decree rendered in a sister state. The
most significant of these bases is an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the
foreign court to adjudicate the merits. Justice Jackson expressed the matter in the following terms:
The qualification means little more than that before receiving a judgment with conclusive effect a court may make sure whether it is the
,enuine judgment it purports to be. Of course, if a tribunal has not
jurisdiction to render a judgment valid by the tests of due process, it is
without validity at home and is entitled to no credit abroad. To give
conclusive1 effect to such a judgment would in itself be a denial of due
process.24

Other bases for refusing to accord full faith and credit have been recognized. For example, only final judgments of a sister state are entitled to
full faith and credit. 242 A judgment that has been procured by fraud may
be impeached in an action brought for its enforcement in Texas "when the
same fraud would have been a defense in an action brought on the judgment in the state in which it was rendered. ' 24 3 In addition, the foreign
24
judgment may be dormant or barred entirely by the law of limitations.
to which a state will be required by the full faith and credit clause to enforce even the
judgment of another state in contravention of its own statutes or policy."
240. Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 368 A.2d 366, 369 (1978).
241. Jackson, FullFaith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1945).
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 107 (1971): "A judgment will

not be recognized or enforced in other states insofar as it is not a final determination under
the local law of the state of rendition." Although there is some authority to the contrary, the

local law of the state of rendition should determine whether the judgment is final. See
Moody v. State, 547 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex. 1977) (per curiam); Van Natta v. Van Natta, 200
S.W.907, 907-08 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1918, writ refd). "We think therefore that we
should give to this Indiana judgment the effect it would be given by the courts of that state,
and that the effect of the appeal on the finality of the judgment and its admissibility in
evidence . . . is to be determined by the laws of the state of Indiana." Id at 907.
243. Bondeson v. Pepsico, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1978, no writ) (citing Burleson v. Burleson, 419 S.W.2d 412, 415-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967), reformed, 439 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1969, no writ); Marsh v. Millward, 381 S.W.2d 110, 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)). For a catalog of cases on this subject, see Pryles, The Impeachment of Sister
State Judgmentsfor Fraud, 25 Sw. L.J. 697 (1971).
244. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5530 (Vernon 1958).
Every action upon a judgment or decree rendered in any other State or territory of the United States, in the District of Columbia or in any foreign country, shall be barred, if by the laws of such State or country such action would
there be barred, and the judgment or decree be incapable of being otherwise
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With respect to dormant foreign judgments not barred by limitation, one
court held that the right to enforce the judgment "means a right of enforcement which exists at the time suit is begun here, and not a mere possibility
of enforcement in the future which depends upon a further proceeding and
showing of fact, and a further exercise of judicial discretion as to whether
execution may issue on such judgment. ' 24 5
II.
A.

FAMILY LAW LITIGATION

Application to Alimony Decrees

A Texas court is required to give full faith and credit to foreign alimony
decrees with respect to past due installments that may not be modified
retroactively.2 46 As in the case of other money judgments, the standard
articulated in International Shoe and its progeny must be satisfied before a
state has judicial jurisdiction to render an alimony decree. 24 7 In Mitchim v.
Mitchim 248 an Arizona judgment for back alimony was rendered against a
Texas resident. In discussing the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by
the Arizona trial court, the Texas Supreme Court indicated that personal
jurisdiction could be obtained on the basis of extraterritorial service of
process upon a nonresident if: (1) a statute of the state ordering support
authorizes extraterritorial service; and (2) sufficient contacts between the
defendant and the forum exist to satisfy "traditional notions of fair play
'2 49
and substantial justice.
When under the law of the rendering jurisdiction, alimony payments do
not become vested when they become due and the rendering court has
continuing authority to reduce or extinguish the arrearage, the alimony
decree is not entitled to full faith and credit until the past due installments
are reduced to judgment. 250 Once a money judgment has been obtained,
however, the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. 25' When under
enforced there; and whether so barred or not no action against a person who
shall have resided in this State during the ten years next preceding such action

shall be brought upon any such judgment or decree rendered more than ten

years before the commencement of such action.
See Turinsky v. Turinsky, 359 S.W.2d 114, 115-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, no writ)

(child support due more than ten years before suit filed in Texas is not recoverable).

245. Schluter v. Sell, 194 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1946, no writ).
246. Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 81-82 (1944); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 11-17
(1910); see Aldrich v. Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540, 543 (1964).
247. Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ): "In the
absence of in personam jurisdiction, however, a court may not enter an order binding on
both parties regarding such matters as division of property outside the state, alimony, and
other decrees involving personal obligations."
248. 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975).
249. Id at 366 (citing Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679 (1968)).
250. Fox v. Fox, 526 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ); see also
Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. i, 16-17 (1910); Gard v. Gard, 150 Tex. 347, 348, 241 S.W.2d 618,
619 (1951); Comment, Enforcement of ForeignAlimonyDecreesin Texas.- A Survey andAnalysis, 38 TEX. L. REV. 82 (1959).
251. Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362, 366 (Tex. 1975):
We recognize that judgments for future payments of alimony and judgments
otherwise subject to modification have "no constitutional claim to a more con-
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the law of the jurisdiction that rendered the alimony decree, past due alimony installments become vested and are not subject to retroactive modification, the arrearage need not be reduced to a money judgment in the
sister state that rendered the divorce decree before the alimony decree is
entitled to full faith and credit in Texas. 252 In this connection several commentators have expressed the view that the burden of proving the finality
of the foreign judgment is upon the claimant. 25 3 This conclusion is based
254
primarily on the reasoning of the Texas appellate court in Ogg v. Ogg,
which held that the presumption that the foreign law is the same as Texas
law does not help a claimant who seeks to enforce a foreign alimony judgment because Texas does not permit a judgment for permanent alimony.
Rule 184a 255 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure should make it a relatively easy matter
to bring the law of a sister state to the attention of the
25 6
trial court.
B. Application to Child Support Orders
As in the case of foreign decrees providing for the periodic payment of
alimony in installments, the standard set forth in InternationalShoe and
subsequent United States Supreme Court opinions concerning the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction must be satisfied before a state has judicial
jurisdiction to make a child support order imposing a personal obligation
upon a nonresident. 257 As in the case of alimony decrees, decrees of sister
states for periodic child support payments are entitled to full faith and
credit when under the law of the rendering state, the right to each installment becomes absolute and vested as it falls due.2 58 On the other hand, if
each installment remains subject to modification under the law of the sister
clusive or final effect" in another state than they have in the state where rendered. .

.

. That is not a problem here, however, with respect to the

delinquent alimony payments that were reduced to judgment in Arizona. The
separate judgment for accrued and unpaid alimony is in a sum certain determined to be due and owing by respondent, and it is entitled to full faith and
credit if the court had personal jurisdiction over him.
252. Worrel v. Worrel, 526 S.W.2d 736, 737 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1975, no
writ); Moody v. Moody, 465 S.W.2d 836, 838-39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 990 (1972).
253. Sampson, supra note 103, at 175; Comment, supra note 250, at 84:
In addition it appears that Texas courts place the burden of pleading and
proving the finality of the foreign judgment upon the party so asserting, which

is contrary to the general notion that every reasonable implication should be
against the power of a foreign court to modify or revoke a judgment for alimony in arrears.
(footnote omitted; citing Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910); Quinn v. Quinn, 216 S.W.2d
1001 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ogg v. O,
165 S.W. 912 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1914, no writ)); see Milner v. Schaefer, 21 S.W.2d 600, 602-03
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1948, writ refd).
254. 165 S.W. 912, 913-14 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1914, no writ).
255. TEX. R. Civ. P. 184a. See generally Thomas, Proofof Foreign Law in Texas, 25 Sw.
L.J. 554 (1971).
256. See Schwartz v. Vecchiotti, 529 S.W.2d 603, 606-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist

Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
257. Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407, 409-10 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
258. Gard v. Gard, 150 Tex. 347, 351, 241 S.W.2d 618, 619-20 (1951).
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state, it is not entitled to full faith and credit until the arrearage is reduced
to a money judgment in the sister state. 259 Some courts have held in connection with an appeal of a common law action to enforce the judgment
that the claimant must prove that the past due support payments are vested
and not subject to modification under the law of the sister state. 260 This
holding is apparently based upon the reasoning that unless the applicable
foreign law is shown to differ from Texas law, the presumption will be
made that the law of the sister state is the same as Texas law, which at the
time did not authorize a money judgment for delinquent child support
payments. 2 6' Since Texas law now authorizes a court to render judgment
against a defaulting party in favor of any party entitled to receive child
support payments, 262 the basis for holding that the burden rests upon the
claimant appears to have been eliminated. In fact, one court of civil appeals stated: "Even if the trial court failed to consider the law of Colorado
regarding finality of judgments for arrearages in child support, the result is
unchanged. The presumption that the law of Colorado is the same as that
of Texas would apply . . . and these Colorado judgments are considered
final under Texas law. 2 63
C
1.

Application to Custody Decrees

United States Supreme Court Decisions

The application of the full faith and credit clause to child custody decrees has been questioned for many years. A series of United States
Supreme Court opinions on the subject have demonstrated that the need
for national uniformity may be outweighed by the interest of the state
where the child resides and enforcement of the sister state decree is attempted. In New York v. Halvey 26 4 the Supreme Court considered
whether a forum state had the authority to modify a sister state custody
259. Brazeal v. Renner, 493 S.W.2d 541, 542-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ)

(citing Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. I (1910)).
260. Brazeal v. Renner, 493 S.W.2d 541, 54243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ);
see also Quinn v. Quinn, 216 S.W.2d 1001, 1003-04 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ

ref'd n.r.e.) (alimony); Ogg v. Ogg, 165 S.W. 912, 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1914,
no writ) (alimony).
261. Brazeal v. Renner, 493 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ):

A closely analogous case is Ogg v. Ogg, 165 S.W. 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1914, no writ), in which a suit was brought to enforce a New York
alimony judgment. The court held that the judgment was not entitled to full
faith and credit under Sistare because plaintiff had failed to plead and prove
that the matured installments were not subject to modification under the law
of New York, and further held that the judgment could not be aided by applying Texas law because Texas does not permit judgments for permanent alimony. The same rule would prevent enforcement of a money judgment for
child support not permitted by Texas law unless it is shown to be a final judgment entitled to full faith and credit.
262. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(c) (Vernon 1975); see also id § 14.08(c)(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983) ("an order providing for the support of a child may be modified only as to
obligations accruing subsequent to the motion to modify").
263. Silcott v. Wilson, 579 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
264. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
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decree without offending the full faith and credit clause. Mrs. Halvey had
left her husband in New York and had taken their child to Florida. She
obtained a Florida ex parte divorce, which purported to give her custody
of the child. On the day before the Florida court awarded permanent custody of the child to Mrs. Halvey, Mr. Halvey snatched the child and returned to New York. Mrs. Halvey then sought to recover the child
through a New York habeas corpus proceeding. After a hearing, the New
York court ordered that custody of the child remain with the mother, but
also ordered that the father have visitation rights, including the right to
keep the child with him during stated vacation periods each year. The
court further required that the mother post a surety bond conditioned on
the delivery of the child to the father for the periods when he had the right
to keep the child with him. The Supreme Court concluded that the New
York proceeding did not offend the full faith and credit clause:
So far as the Full Faith and Credit Clause is concerned, what Florida
could do in modifying the decree, New York may do. .

.

. The gen-

eral rule is that this command requires the judgment of a sister State
to be given full, not partial, credit in the State of the forum. .

.

. But

a judgment has no constitutional claim to a more conclusive or final
effect in the State of the forum than it has in the State where rendered. .

.

. Whatever may be the authority of a State to undermine a

judgment of a sister State on grounds not cognizable in the State
where the judgment was rendered

. . .

it is clear that the State of the

forum has at least as much leeway to disregard the judgment, to qual265
ify it, or to depart from it as does the State where it was rendered.
Consequently, the New York court was not bound to enforce automatically the Florida decree without imposing modifications because the Florida court had the power to modify it at all times, not merely under the
theory of changed circumstances, but also upon proof
of facts that were
266
not presented or considered at the former hearing.
Of more interest in the present day context is a statement by the
Supreme Court that was not necessary to its decision in Halvey:
The narrow ground on which we rest the decision makes it unnecessary for us to consider several other questions argued, e.g., whether
Florida at the time of the original decree had jurisdiction over the
child, the father having removed him from the State after the proceedings started but before the decree was entered; whether in absence of
personal service the Florida decree of custody had any binding effect
on the husband; whether the power of New York to modify the custody decree was greater than Florida's power; whether the State which
has jurisdiction over the child may, regardless of a custody decree rendered by another State, make such orders concerning custody as the
welfare of the child from
time to time requires. On all these problems
we reserve decision. 267
265. Id at 614-15 (citations omitted).

266. Id at 612-13.
267. Id at 615-16.
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Subsequently, in the much criticized 268 case of May v. Anderson,269 the
Supreme Court gave conflicting responses to several of the questions it had
reserved in Halvey for future determination. The issue presented in May'
was whether an Ohio court was required to give full faith and credit to a
Wisconsin decree awarding custody of minor children to their father. Although Wisconsin had been the matrimonial domicile before the petition
for divorce was filed, the wife had taken the children to Ohio and established residence in that state. She was served with process in Ohio pursuant to a Wisconsin nonresident notice statute, which was intended for use
in divorce actions but which made no mention of its availability in a child
custody proceeding. The Wisconsin court granted the divorce and
awarded custody to the father. The father subsequently sought to enforce
the decree in Ohio under an Ohio habeas corpus procedure designed to
secure summary enforcement of valid court orders concerning the right to
possession of children without opening the door for the modification of a
prior custody award on a showing of changed circumstances. The Ohio
trial and appellate courts concluded that the full faith and credit clause
compelled enforcement of the Wisconsin custody decree.
The Supreme Court held that the forum was not required to give the
Wisconsin custody decree full faith and credit. Four opinions were written
by members of the court, however. Justice Burton, writing for four members of the Court, stated that the Wisconsin decree was not entitled to full
faith and credit because it was rendered without jurisdiction over the per270
son of the nonresident mother:
Separated as our issue is from that of the future interests of the
children, we have before us the elemental question whether a court of
a state, where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor present, may
cut off her immediate right to the care, custody, management and
companionship of her minor children without having jurisdiction over
her in personam. Rights far more precious to appellant than property
rights will be cut off if she is to be bound by the Wisconsin award of
custody.
.In the instant case, we recognize that a mother's right to custody of her children is a personal 27right entitled to at least as much
protection as her right to alimony. '
Justice Burton also rejected an argument made on behalf of the father that
the children were technically domiciled in Wisconsin and held that: "We
find it unnecessary to determine the children's legal domicile because, even
if it be with their father, that does not give Wisconsin, certainly as against
Ohio, the personal jurisdiction that it must have in order to deprive their
268. See generally Hazard, supra note 139.
269. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
270. The opinion does not discuss why the nonresident mother was not subject to jurisdiction. Wisconsin was the matrimonial domicile. Although she was served in Ohio, the
mother's absence from Wisconsin had been for a short penod (approximately one month)
when the Wisconsin proceeding was instituted. Id at 530.
271. Id at 533-34.
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mother of her personal right to their immediate possession. ' 272 Unfortunately, Justice Burton's opinion says little about how the issue of personal
jurisdiction should be analyzed. Although the due process clause is not
mentioned in the Burton opinion, the opinion could be read as authority
for the proposition that a decree adjudicating custody must be based on
personal service in the forum state or the equivalent minimum contacts on
the part of a nonresident parent.
Justice Frankfurter agreed with the members subscribing to Justice Burton's plurality opinion that Ohio need not have given full faith and credit
to the Wisconsin decree. Justice Frankfurter did not conclude, however,
that personal jurisdiction is required before one state may give full faith
and credit to a foreign decree. 273 In fact, the concurring opinion also indicates that for Ohio to respect the Wisconsin decree would not offend the
due process clause. In addition, Justice Frankfurter suggested that child
custody awards are not entitled to full faith and credit when the local interof national unity that underlies the
est of the forum outweighs the "interest
' 274
Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Justices Jackson and Reed dissented. They concluded that Justice Burton's plurality opinion prohibited Ohio from giving full faith and credit to
the Wisconsin decree. They found analogies to property right cases entirely unpersuasive because they concluded that custody determinations
should be viewed, not with the idea of adjudicating parental rights to the
children, but with the idea of the children's welfare. 275 Finally, the dissenters' view of Justice Frankfurter's concurrence was extremely critical:
"The interpretive concurrence, if it be a true interpretation, seems to reduce the law of custody to a rule of seize-and-run. '276 Justice Minton also
dissented.

277

Two subsequent United States Supreme Court opinions provide little
additional guidance. In Kovacs v. Brewer 278 the Supreme Court held, following Halvey, that a North Carolina court had the authority to modify a
New York custody decree, which was modifiable by a New York court on
the basis of changed circumstances. 279 The Supreme Court in Ford v.
272. Id at 534. The footnote that accompanies this conclusion indicates that when a
parent removes a minor child from the child's domicile for the purpose of evading process or
escaping jurisdiction, other considerations might require a different analysis. Id at 534 n.8.
273. "For Ohio to give respect to the Wisconsin decree would not offend the Due Process
Clause. Ohio is no more precluded from doing so than a court of Ontario or Manitoba
would be, were the mother to bring the children into one of these provinces." Id at 535-36.
274. Id at 536. Justice Frankfurter's subsequent dissenting opinion in Kovacs v. Brewer,
356 U.S. 604, 609-16 (1958), indicates that the full faith and credit clause does not require
deference to foreign custody decrees even when both parents are before the court that originally rendered the decree.
275. 345 U.S. at 540 (Jackson & Reed, JJ., dissenting).
276. Id at 542.
277. Id
278. 356 U.S. 604 (1958).
279. In his dissent Justice Frankfurter questioned the applicability of the full faith and
credit clause to the entire issue:
In short, both the underlying purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
the nature of the decrees militate strongly against a constitutionally enforced
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Ford280 again failed to resolve the questions reserved in the latter part of
the Halvey opinion for future discussion.
As the review of the foregoing cases indicates, the United States
Supreme Court has steadfastly avoided resolving the issue of the proper
interpretation of the full faith and credit clause or the application of the
due process clause to custody disputes. Beyond the holdings that the full
faith and credit clause does not preclude modification of a foreign state's
custody decree based on grounds for modification permissible in that state,
the picture remains hazy. The questions posed in the latter portion of the
Halvey opinion have not been answered. A minority of jurisdictions have
concluded that full faith and credit need not be given to custody decrees. 28 1 This confusing situation has contributed substantially to the en282
actment of federal and state legislation.
2. Development of the Texas JurisdictionalTest in Custody Litigation
Prior to May v. Anderson Texas viewed a custody determination as a
status determination that did not require personal jurisdiction because it
was an in rem proceeding. 283 Moreover, despite the fact that Justice Burof
ton's plurality opinion in May did not represent the view of a majority
284
the court, May was accepted for a time as authoritative in Texas.
In Perry v. Ponder the court analyzed Justice Burton's plurality opinion
from May as not imposing a requirement that a nonresident either be personally served in Texas or be subject to the minimum contacts doctrine.
requirement of respect to foreign custody decrees. New York itself, the State
for whose decree full faith and credit is here demanded, has rejected the applicability of that requirement to custody decrees.

1d at 613; see Bachman v. Mejias, I N.Y.2d 575, 580, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907, 136 N.E.2d

866, 868 (1956) ("The full faith and credit clause does not apply to custody decrees."); see
also Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
280. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
281. See Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 386 A.2d 366, 369-76 (1978), and cases cited
therein.
282. See infra Part C.
283. The original Restatement of Conflict of Laws adopted the child's domicile as the
jurisdictional test in custody cases. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1934). The
Restatement (Second) adopted three alternate grounds of jurisdiction: (1) domicile of the
child; (2) physical presence of the child; or (3) personal jurisdiction over both parents. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971). See also Sampsell v. Superior
Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948). This relatively flexible set of standards means
that two or more states could have concurrent jurisdiction and thereby act in competition
with each other. Prior to the adoption of the Family Code long-arm provision relating to
suits affecting the parent-child relationship (TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983)), Texas case law held that a Texas court had jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination if and only if the child was either domiciled or physically present in Texas.
See Exparte Birmingham, 150 Tex. 595, 598-601, 244 S.W.2d 977, 978-80 (1952) (personal
jurisdiction over both parents did not confer jurisdiction over child custody); Peacock v.
Bradshaw, 145 Tex. 68, 76-77, 194 S.W.2d 551, 556 (1946); Mills v. Howard, 228 S.W.2d 906,
908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, no writ).
284. See Spitzmiller v. Spitzmiller, 429 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Sampson, supra note 103, at 209 n.148: "It is preferable to avoid the May rule by extending personal jurisdiction over absent parents, i.e. the
Texas approach."
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The court of civil appeals made several observations concerning the May
plurality opinion:
(1) May did not involve a case in which the child and one parent
resided in the state in which the custody decree was rendered ...
(2) Since the Burton opinion did not represent the view of a majority of the court, the decision must be taken as authoritative only on
the narrow ground stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring
opinion. . . . His view was that the Court was deciding only that the
full faith and credit clause did not require the Ohio court to accept the
Wisconsin disposition of custody, without precluding the Ohio court
from recognizing that disposition as a matter of comity under the local law of Ohio.
(3) The Burton opinion in May must be interpreted in the light of
subsequent 285
expressions in Shaffer v. Heitner and Stanley v.
Illinois....
(4) The Burton opinion in May rests solely on the rights of parents
and does not consider the welfare of the children, which is the primary consideration in the selection of a forum for custody adjudica286
tion, according to the overwhelming consensus of legal scholars.
After rejecting the interpretation of May that personal jurisdiction in the
minimum contacts sense is prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction to
make a child custody determination binding upon a nonresident, 287 the
Dallas court of civil appeals concluded that:
[D]ue process permits adjudication of the custody of a child residing
in the forum state without a showing of "minimum contacts" on the
part of the nonresident parent, and we also hold that if the [notice?]
requirements of due process and applicable procedural rules are met,
a Texas court has "personal jurisdiction" over the nonresident. . . to
adjudicate the custody issue, even though it may not have such jurisdiction to render a personal judgment enforcing or imposing affirmative duties on the nonresident. We hold further that without such
personal jurisdiction the court has no power to make a binding cus285. Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 320-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ)
(emphasis omitted). Shaffer's somewhat overstated point that all assertions of jurisdiction
must be in accordance with the fairness standards of InternationalShoe is accompanied by
footnote 30, which provides: We do not suggest that jurisdictional doctrines other than those
discussed in the text, such as the particularized rules governing adjudications of status, are
inconsistent with the standard of fairness." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 n.30 (1977).
This footnote has been interpreted as justifying the exercise of custody jurisdiction as an
exception to the minimum contacts requirement of InternationalShoe. Bodenheimer &
Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12
U.C.D. L. REV. 229, 239-41 (1979).
286. 604 S.W.2d at 321 (emphasis omitted).
287. Some cases hold that personal jurisdiction is not necessary because subject matter
jurisdiction is good enough to make the decree valid in Texas. Compare Thornlow v.
Thornlow, 576 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ dism'd w.o.j.), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980), with Hilt v. Kirkpatrick, 538 S.W.2d 849, 851-52 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1976, no writ): Without minimum contacts, adjudication may proceed on the
basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and while the resulting decree is good in Texas, it may
not be recognized outside of Texas.
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tody adjudication based on subject-matter jurisdiction alone. 288
In this connection the test to be applied is "whether the child and the
mother have been in Texas long enough to give this state a sovereign's
interest in and responsibility for the child's welfare and to provide access
to make an informed decision concerning the child's
to sufficient evidence
289
best interests."
3. Texas Pre-Family Code Response to Sister State Custody Decrees
Prior to the passage of the current provisions of title 2 of the Texas Family Code, Texas courts had concluded that child custody decrees of sister
states having jurisdiction to render the decrees were entitled to full faith
and credit.2 90 In Bukovich v. Bukovich 29' an Indiana child custody decree
modified the Indiana court's prior order by changing the custody of the
child from the mother to the father. Before the decree could be executed,
the mother and child left Indiana and moved to Texas. The father brought
a habeas corpus proceeding to obtain possession of the child. In response,
the mother filed a cross-action for custody, alleging a change of circumstances since the date of the Indiana modification decree. The case was
tried to a jury, which found that a change of circumstances had in fact
occurred, and the trial court awarded custody to the mother. Although the
court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, 292 the Texas
293
Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented by the mother
was insufficient to support the jury verdict. Thus, the high court ordered
the trial court to issue a warrant to the sheriff to bring the child before the
trial judge so that the child could be placed in the father's custody.
Several distinct but related principles are set forth in the supreme court's
opinion concerning the relationship of full faith and credit principles to
child custody determinations made by sister states. First, Texas courts will
give full faith and credit to a child custody decree of a sister state and will
not order a change of custody in the absence of proof of a subsequent
material change of conditions. 294 Secondly, at the time of its rendition, a
custody judgment is res judicata of the question of the best interests of the
child. 29 5 Thirdly, a material change of conditions affecting the welfare of
the child must be demonstrated before a change of custody is war288. 604 S.W.2d at 313-14.
289. Id.at 318.
290. Meucci v. Meucci, 457 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tex. 1970); Bukovich v. Bukovich, 399
S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. 1966); Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 145, 112 S.W.2d 165, 168
(1938).
291. 399 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1966).
292. Bukovich v. Bukovich, 391 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965), rev'd, 399
S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1966).
293. "The evidence offered by her was, in substance, that she would have an opportunity
for employment in a bank in Oak Lawn, Illinois, and that she would be a guest in the home
of responsible friends until arrangements could be made for her own living quarters." 399
S.W.2d at 529-30.
294. Id at 529; see also Short v. Short, 163 Tex. 287, 290-91, 354 S.W.2d 933, 935-36
(1962).
295. 399 S.W.2d at 529; see also Ogletree v. Crates, 363 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex. 1963);
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ranted. 296 In substance, Bukovich stands for the practical proposition that
Texas will not be a haven for child snatchers. As a result of the principle
that custody could be redetermined if the noncustodial parent could prove
a material change of circumstances affecting the child's welfare, however,
attempts to relitigate child custody determinations made by sister states
continued.
In Meucci v. Meucci 297 an Illinois court found the mother guilty of adultery and unfit to have care and custody of her four children. The court
awarded custody to the father. Prior to the conclusion of the Illinois divorce proceeding and in violation of the Illinois court's temporary custody
orders, the mother moved to Texas with the children. One month after the
conclusion of the Illinois divorce proceeding, the father filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in Texas. The mother brought a crossaction for change of custody. The trial court gave custody to the mother,
despite the fact that her pleading failed to allege a material change of circumstances following the date of the Illinois judgment. The court based its
decision on testimony that the mother had appeared emotionally and mentally stable since moving to Texas. After the court of civil appeals af298
firmed, the Texas Supreme Court reversed without hearing arguments.
The court simply held that the decision of the court of civil appeals was in
conflict with the supreme court's opinion in Bukovich .299
This same qualified deference has also been afforded to ex parte modification decrees rendered by sister states in order to change custody from a
nonresident legal custodian to a parent who continues to live in the decree
state. 30 0 Deference to modification decrees under these circumstances is
based on the reasoning that a proceeding for modification of a custody
award is permissible as a continuation of the original proceeding in which
the award was made with respect to a party over whom the court had jurisdiction in the original proceeding. Deference is given even though the
court would not have had jurisdiction under the facts existing at the time
of the modification but for the existence of the original decree. Not surTaylor v. Meek, 154 Tex. 305, 309-10, 276 S.W.2d 787, 790 (1955); Wilson v. Elliott, 96 Tex.
472, 474-75, 73 S.W. 946, 946-47 (1903).
296. 399 S.W.2d at 530: "The facts here shown do not make the exceptional case which
is prerequisite to an exercise ofjurisdiction by the courts of Texas to the extent of a new and
independent determination of child custody rights." See also Knowles v. Grimes, 437
S.W.2d 816, 817 (Tex. 1969) ("As a matter of public policy, there should be a high degree of
stability in the home and surroundings of a young child, and, in the absence of materially
changed conditions, the disturbing influence of re-litigation should be discouraged.");
Mumma v. Aguirre, 364 S.W.2d 220, 221-23 (Tex. 1963).
297. 457 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1970).
298. 454 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970), rev'd, 457 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1970);
see TEX. R. Civ. P. 483.
299. The supreme court's summary reversal evidences its apparent annoyance with the
proceedings conducted in the lower courts; the per curiam opinion concludes with the sentence that "no motion for rehearing may be filed in the cause." 457 S.W.2d at 49. But see
Hollis v. Hollis, 508 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ).
300. See Bull v. Wilson, 362 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, no
writ); Dowden v. Fisher, 338 S.W.2d 534, 537-38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1960, no writ).
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prisingly, these cases have been subjected to criticism. 30 i
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE
PART C.
"INTERSTATE CHILD": UCCJA, PKPA, AND THE TEXAS
FAMILY CODE

I.

THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT

The Purpose of the UCCJA

A.

The somewhat deferential attitude accorded original and modification
decrees of sister states apparently was not practiced uniformly in other
states. The chaos and confusion concerning the application of the due process clause (InternationalShoe's personal jurisdiction standards) and the
full faith and credit clause contributed to hometown decisions in favor of
resident ex-spouses, punitive custody modifications when a legal custodian
moved to a new state, and child snatching. The hope of the drafters of the
UCCJA was that these legal and practical problems could be resolved by
uniform legislation. As a result of the enactment of the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, a basic understanding of the UCCJA and its
interpretive problems will frequently be prerequisite to the proper handling of custody disputes involving the interstate child.
B. JurisdictionalProvisions
1. The Basic Provision
Section 3 of the UCCJA is its basic jurisdictional provision. Under that
section a court that has the competence to decide child custody matters has
custody determination under any one of the
jurisdiction to make a child
30 2
following circumstances:
(1) The state in which the court is located is the "home state" of the
child, i.e., generally the state in which the child, immediately preceding the
commencement of the proceeding, lived with its parents, a parent, or a
person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months.
(2) The state in which the court is located had been the child's home
state within six months before the commencement of the proceeding, and a
parent or person acting as a parent continues to reside in the state.
(3) The court's exercise of jurisdiction is in the best interest of the child
because (a) the child and its parents or at least one contestant have a significant connection with the state; and (b) substantial evidence is available
301. See Sampson, supra note 103, at 228:
Each apparently failed to perceive the distinction between an original adjudication and a subsequent modification adverse to an absent, nonresident, legal
custodian granted in a wholly ex parte proceeding. While efforts to prevent
hometown decisions may be laudable, they serve no good purpose if the deference shown foreign decrees is excessive and is given without analysis of the
factual context in which the modification occurred.
302. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as UCCJA § -, 9 U.L.A. at -].
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within the state concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships.
(4) The child is physically present in the state and (a) has been abandoned; or (b) an emergency situation involving mistreatment or abuse has
arisen.
(5) No other court has jurisdiction or a court of another state has declined to exercise it on the ground that the forum state is a more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child and the assumption of
jurisdiction by the court in the forum state is in the best interest of the
child.
Under the basic provision two sister states may have concurrent
jurisdiction.
2

Continuing Jurisdiction

While section 3 is the basic jurisdictional provision, section 14 must be
consulted when a person seeks to modify a conservatorship determination
made by a court of a sister state. Section 14 provides:
If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this
State shall not modify that decree unless (1) it appears to the court of
this State that the court which rendered the decree does not now have
jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this Act or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the
decree and (2) the court of this State has jurisdiction. 30 3
In other words, before a modification decree may be rendered, the court of
the state in which the modification proceeding is instituted must have jurisdiction under one of the alternative provisions set forth in section 3 of
the UCCJA. In addition, it must appear to the court asserting jurisdiction
that the court that rendered the decree sought to be modified does not still
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with those set forth in section 3 of the UCCJA or that the court that
rendered the decree has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify its
decree.
The following two examples illustrate the interrelationship of sections 3
and 14 of the UCCJA. Assume that both Montana and Oregon are
UCCJA jurisdictions. A husband and wife marry in Montana, have a
child, and subsequently separate. If the wife takes the child to Oregon,
and they continue to reside in Oregon for a period in excess of six months,
Oregon will have jurisdiction under section 3 to make a child custody determination. Oregon's jurisdiction would be based upon the home-state
jurisdictional provision. Montana's jurisdiction would be based upon the
portion of section 3 that permits a court to exercise jurisdiction if the child
and at least one contestant have a significant connection with the state and
substantial evidence is available within the state concerning the child's
3°4
present or future well-being.
303. Id § 14, 9 U.L.A. at 153-54.
304. UCCJA provisions designed to resolve concurrent jurisdiction problems are set
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Once a child custody determination has been made, section 14 of the
UCCJA must also be consulted. If, for example, a custody determination
had been made in Montana awarding the mother custody of the child, and
the father subsequently abducts the child and takes it to Oregon where he
resides with the child for a period in excess of six months, Oregon would
be required to defer to the continuing jurisdiction of Montana pursuant to
section 14 of the UCCJA, even though Oregon would be the new home
state of the child. The only exception would be if it appeared to Oregon
that the Montana court did not continue to have significant connection/substantial evidence jurisdiction or the Montana court declined to assume its jurisdiction to modify its own prior decree.
Several distinct points of view have been expressed concerning the
proper interpretation of sections 3 and 14 of the UCCJA with respect to
continuing jurisdiction. The late Professor Bodenheimer expressed the following view:
Exclusive continuing jurisdiction is not affected by the child's residence in another state for six months or more. Although the new state
becomes the child's home state, significant connection jurisdiction
continues in the state of the prior decree where the court record and
other evidence exists and where one parent or another contestant continues to reside. Only when the child and all parties have moved
to another state's continuing jurisdiction no longer
away is deference
30 5
required.
Recent cases from several UCCJA states have either qualified or rejected the Bodenheimer view. The pattern is hardly uniform, however. In
re Marriageof Leonard30 6 involved a situation in which the child's mother
was given custody by virtue of a 1974 Georgia divorce decree. In 1978 the
child journeyed to California to visit her father. She stayed in California
with her father through the 1978-1979 school year. At the end of the
school year her father filed in California to modify custody. In concluding
that the California court had jurisdiction to modify the Georgia decree, the
California appellate court specifically rejected Professor Bodenheimer's
theory that the original-decree-state's jurisdiction over modification of
conservatorship continues exclusively until both parents leave the original
state. Although the California appellate court did not conclude that Georgia ceased to have significant connection/substantial evidence jurisdiction,
forth in UCCJA § 6 (Simultaneous Proceedings in Other States), § 7 (Inconvenient Forum),
and § 8 (Jurisdiction Declined by Reason of Conduct).

305. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, nitial and Continuing Jurisdiction Under the
UCCJA, 14 FAM. L.Q. 203, 215 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody]. For the same interpretation, but criticizing the UCCJA for it, see Sampson, supra

note 103, at 232-35. Compare a somewhat more restrained interpretation in Bodenheimer,
Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 978, 989 (1977)

(suggesting outer limits of "3 or 4 years, depending upon the circumstances") [hereinafter
cited as Bodenheimer, Progress]. See also Ratner, ProceduralDue ProcessandJurisdictionto
Adyudicate. (a) Effective-Litigation Values vs. the TerritorialImperative (b) The Uniform
Child Custody JurisdictionAct, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1981).

306. 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1981).
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as the literal language of UCCJA section 14 seems to require, it found that
California's significant connections tipped the scales in favor of California.
In substance, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the
trial court's determination that California met both the home state test and
the significant connection test under the UCCJA and that California was
not, therefore, required to defer to the jurisdiction of Georgia for modifica30 7
tion of the prior Georgia decree.
Section 14 was similarly interpreted by a New York court in Leslie v.
ConstanceF 308 In that case a New York court concluded that a California custody decree could be modified by a New York court although the
legal custodian continued to reside in California after the child had resided
in New York for about one year. In determining that California no longer
had jurisdiction, the New York court held that even though California arguably met the significant connection test, it no longer had jurisdiction
because it was not the home state and did not meet the evidence-availability test of UCCJA section 3(a)(2). The court reasoned that this section is
premised upon the primacy of the child's best interests and that it grants
jurisdiction to the forum possessing optimum access to relevant evidence
concerning the child and the family. 30 9 The method for ascertaining
whether or not substantial evidence concerning a child's present and future
well-being exists in a particular jurisdiction is not fully explained in Constance. It contains, however, a strong suggestion that once a new home
state is established, the significant connection/substantial evidence connection with the old home state ordinarily will be eliminated because the evidence concerning the child's present or future well-being in the old home
state will be overbalanced and eliminated by substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future well-being in the new home state. This
307. Id. at 460-66, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 913-16. Unlike two earlier California decisions
(Palm v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 456, 158 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1979); Allison v. Superior
Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 993, 160 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1979)), which do not appear to understand
the interpretive problem or the Bodenheimer position concerning the proper interpretation
of § 14 of the UCCJA, the court recognized and rejected the Bodenheimer view in the following terms:
The late Professor Brigette M. Bodenheimer, reporter for the special Committee which drafted the Act, maintained that the Act clearly and properly contemplates continuing and exclusive jurisdiction in the original decree state
unless the child and both parents have moved from that state or the original
decree state has declined jurisdiction. She bases her interpretation on the "unambiguous" language of UCCJA § 14 (Civ. Code, § 5163) supplemented by
UCCJA § 8(b) (Civ. Code, § 5157, subd. (a)), the so-called "clean hands doctrine." . .. She asserts that "[E]xclusive continuing jurisdiction is not affected
by the child's residence in another state for six months or more." ... We do
not agree that UCCJA § 14 (Civ. Code, § 5163, subd. (1)) unambiguously affirms continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to modify in the decree state as
long as one parent continues to reside there and the state has not declined
jurisdiction. The Commissioner's Note to section 14 indicates only a "preference" for the decree state.
122 Cal. App. 3d at 460-61, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
308. 110 Misc. 2d 86, 441 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Fam. Ct. 1981).
309. 441 N.Y.S.2d at 918-19; see also Kioukis v. Kioukis, 440 A.2d 894, 897 (Conn. 1981)
("The first state's exclusive jurisdiction does not continue indefinitely. At some point the
child's connections with the first state become too tenuous ....").
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result may also be justified by focusing on the language of section 3(a)(2)
concerning the best interests of the child.
In some situations other courts have placed more importance upon the
preference in favor of the state that rendered the initial decree. In In re
Custody of Ross 310 a Montana couple with a young child separated. After
the separation and while the child was temporarily in the father's custody,
the father, his girlfriend, and the child moved to Oregon. The mother obtained a Montana divorce and was awarded custody of the child. Since
she did not know the whereabouts of the child until approximately eighteen months after the Montana custody decree, she did not seek enforcement of the Montana decree in Oregon until that time. When enforcement
was sought, the father requested the Oregon court to assume jurisdiction
and to hold a full hearing to determine custody of the child. After this
hearing the trial court concluded that Oregon had jurisdiction, denied the
mother's petition for enforcement of the Montana decree, and awarded
31
custody of the child to the father. The court of appeals affirmed. '
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed. On the basis of its interpretation
of UCCJA section 14 as adopted in Montana and Oregon, the Oregon
Supreme Court concluded that both the significant connection and substantial evidence requirements for continuing jurisdiction in Montana
were fulfilled because the child's mother continued to live and work in
Montana and "the relationship between mother and child [was] itself a
significant one." 31 2 Moreover, the child's older sister continued to reside
in the family home with the mother, and other friends and neighbors continued to live nearby in Montana. With respect to the substantial evidence
criterion, the Oregon court concluded that since the child had lived in
Montana from birth until it was abducted and taken to Oregon, substantial
evidence concerning the child's well-being existed in Montana. Moreover,
evidence existed in Montana concerning the child's father and mother.
The Oregon Supreme Court stated:
In the case of an abducted child whose whereabouts is concealed,
where "substantial evidence" of a child's present or future welfare for
purposes of the jurisdiction section [UCCJA § 3] still exists in the decree state as well as in the forum state for the reasons set forth above,
the decree state continues to have jurisdiction
under the Act for a rea3 13
sonable time following the abduction.
The question arises whether the same result would have been reached by
the Oregon Supreme Court if the child had not been abducted from Montana. While no doubt exists that this factor strongly influenced the Oregon
310. 291 Or. 263, 630 P.2d 353 (1981).
311. 47 Or. App. 631, 614 P.2d 1225 (1980). The intermediate appellate court believed
itself bound by Marriage of Settle, 276 Or. 759, 556 P.2d 962 (1976), but one justice suggested that Settle should be reexamined. 614 P.2d at 1229.
312. 630 P.2d at 361.
313. Id. at 363-64. In a footnote, the Oregon Supreme Court quoted a passage from a
Bodenheimer law review article that suggests jurisdiction would not continue in the old
home state for more than "an outer limit of 3 or 4 years." Id at 364 n.22 (quoting
Bodenheimer, Progress,supra note 305, at 989).
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Supreme Court, 3 14 how the abduction factor is related to the significant
connection/substantial evidence analysis or section 14 of the UCCJA is
unclear. 3 15 Finally, although there is substantial debate concerning a decree state's continuing jurisdiction as long as one contestant continues to
reside in that state, when all parties have moved away from the decree
state, the decree state no longer has jurisdiction under UCCJA section 3
and, therefore UCCJA section 14 is no impediment to the modification of
the decree by a court of a state having jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination. 31 6 The concept of continuing jurisdiction in the interstate
context is embodied in the provisions of the UCCJA. Unfortunately,
under current judicial interpretations of the UCCJA, the extent to which
jurisdiction continues varies depending upon the UCCJA jurisdiction
whose interpretation of the supposedly uniform law is being consulted.
3. Rejection of the Personal Jurisdiction Approach
A significant aspect of the UCCJA is its treatment of the confusion generated by the United States Supreme Court's opinions concerning the application of the due process clause and the full faith and credit clause to
child custody determinations. The drafters of the UCCJA rejected the personal jurisdiction approach to child custody determinations, which was apparently adopted by Justice Burton's plurality opinion in May v.
Anderson. 3 17 Section 12 of the UCCJA provides that:
[a] custody decree rendered by a court of this State which had jurisdiction under section 3 binds all parties who have been served in this
State or notified in accordance with section 5 or who have submitted
314. 630 P.2d at 364 n.23:
This holding is consistent with the results in recent decisions in similar cases
by courts of several other jurisdictions. See Both v. Superior Court, In and
For County of Mohave, 121 Ariz. 381, 590 P.2d 920 (1979); Kraft v. District
Court, 197 Colo. 10, 593 P.2d 321 (1979); Matter of Potter, 10 Ohio Op. 3d
214, 377 N.E.2d 536 (1978). These cases essentially hold that in "seize-andrun" cases, where there exists a valid custody decree and the "wronged" parent continues to reside in the state of the decree from which the child was
removed, jurisdiction under the Act will exist presently for purposes of § 14(a)
of the Act. . . and a petition for modification may not be entertained in another state.
315. Section 8(a) of the UCCJA provides: "If the petitioner for an initial decree has
wrongfully taken the child from another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances." 9 U.L.A. at 142. Section 8(b) of the UCCJA provides:
Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to custody, has improperly removed the
child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly retained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of
physical custody. If the petitioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree of another state the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if
this is just and proper under the circumstances.
Id
316. See Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note 305, at 215; see also UCCJA § 14,
9 U.L.A. commissioner's note at 154.
317. 345 U.S. 528 (1953); see supra notes 269-72.
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to the jurisdiction3 18of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard.
Based on a traditional theory that custody determinations, as distinguished
from support actions, are proceedings affecting status or proceedings in
rem, there is no requirement for personal jurisdiction in the International
Shoe 319 sense under the UCCJA. Section 5320 of the UCCJA provides
that notice is to be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual
notice, for example: (1) personal delivery outside the state in the same
manner as prescribed for service within the state; (2) in the manner prescribed by the law of the place where service is to be effectuated; (3) by
mail, requesting a receipt, addressed to the person to be served; or (4) as
directed by the court.
4. Concurrent JurisdictionProblems.-Tie-Breakers
While the UCCJA has not eliminated the existence of concurrent jurisdiction, it does contain several provisions that address the problem. Section 6321 of the UCCJA provides that a court shall not exercise jurisdiction
if at the time of filing in that court, a proceeding concerning the same child
is already pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the UCCJA. This result occurs unless the
proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because "this State" is a
more appropriate forum or for some other reason. Moreover, if a court
determines from the pleadings, 322 a child custody registry established in
the state, 323 or otherwise that there is a simultaneous proceeding pending
elsewhere, it is supposed to communicate with the other court to determine
324
which court is the more appropriate forum.
Section 7(a) of the UCCJA provides that:
[a] court which has jurisdiction under this Act to make an initial or
modification decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time
before making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to
make a custody determination under the circumstances of the325case
and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.
The following factors should be considered in making this jurisdictional
determination: (1) "if another state is or recently was the child's home
state;" (2) "if another state has a closer connection with the child and his
family or with the child and one or more of the contestants;" (3) "if substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships is more readily available in another
state;" (4) "if the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less
318. 9 U.L.A. at 149.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

326 U.S. 310 (1945); see UCCJA § 12, 9 U.L.A. comment at 149-50.
9 U.L.A. at 131; see also UCCJA § 4, 9 U.L.A. at 129.
9 U.L.A. at 134.
See UCCJA § 9, 9 U.L.A. at 145-46.
See id § 16, 9 U.L.A. at 160.
Id. § 6(b), 9 U.L.A. at 134; see also id §§ 19-22, 9 U.L.A. at 162-67.

325. Id. § 7(a), 9 U.L.A. at 137.
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appropriate;" and (5) "if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state
would contravene any of the purposes [of the UCCJA]. ' ' 326
Another basis for a court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction is set forth
in UCCJA section 8. Under this section a court may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction to make an initial decree when a child has been wrongfully
taken from another state. 327 Moreover, unless the best interest of the child
requires it, a court is prohibited from exercising its jurisdiction to modify a
custody decree of another state if the petitioner has improperly removed
the child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has
improperly retained the child after a visit. 328 In addition, when a court
dismisses a petition under section 8 of the UCCJA, it may charge the petitioner with necessary travel and other expenses, including attorneys' fees,
329
incurred by other parties or their witnesses.
C

Enforcement and Mod~flcation of Sister State Decrees
Under the UCCJ4

Procedures and standards for the enforcement of sister state child custody decrees are set forth in the UCCJA. Section 13 provides:
The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification decree of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this
Act . . .so long as this decree has not been modified in accordance
with jurisdictional
standards substantially similar to those of this
330
Act.
Concerning recognition and enforcement of child custody decrees made by
sister states, section 13 must be read in conjunction with section 14 because
the latter section controls the question of when a foreign state may modify
a sister state's initial or modification decree that is entitled to recognition
and enforcement. Section 14(a) of the UCCJA prohibits modification unless: "(1) it appears to the court of this State that the court which rendered
the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this Act or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) the court of this State has jurisdiction."'33' The following hypotheticals illustrate the interaction of
UCCJA sections 13 and 14.
(1) Assume that a married couple living in Alabama obtains an Alabama divorce and that the wife is made legal custodian of the couple's
child. The wife thereafter moves with the child to California. If the husband, who continues to reside in Alabama, goes back to court and obtains
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id § 7(c), 9 U.L.A. at 137-38.
Id § 8(a), 9 U.L.A. at 142.
Id § 8(b), 9 U.L.A. at 142.
Id § 8(c), 9 U.L.A. at 142.

330. Id § 13, 9 U.L.A. at 151. Additionally, UCCJA § 15(a) provides: "A custody de-

cree so filed has the same effect and shall be enforced in like manner as a custody decree
rendered by a court of this State." 9 U.L.A. at 158.
331. Id § 14(a), 9 U.L.A. at 153-54.
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a change of custody after the wife and the child have been gone five
months from Alabama, must California recognize and enforce the decree?
Since Alabama constituted the child's home state before the child and the
wife moved to California, they have not been gone six months before the
commencement of the Alabama modification proceeding, and the husband
continues to reside in Alabama, the Alabama court has jurisdiction under
UCCJA section 3(a)(1) to render the modification decree. Although the
Alabama court could decline to exercise its jurisdiction by concluding that
it is an inconvenient forum pursuant to UCCJA section 7, UCCJA section
3 confers jurisdiction upon the Alabama court to make the modification
decree. Consequently, pursuant to section 13 of the UCCJA, recognition
and enforcement is required.
(2) If under the same facts as the preceding hypothetical, the child and
mother have been gone one year from Alabama when the Alabama modification decree is made, must California recognize and enforce that decree?
Again, under section 13 the issue is whether Alabama "had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this
Act." Despite the fact that Alabama no longer constitutes the home state
of the child and that Alabama has ceased being the home state of the child
more than six months before the commencement of the Alabama modification proceeding, since Alabama could still have jurisdiction to make a
modification decree pursuant to UCCJA section 3(a)(2) (significant connection/substantial evidence jurisdiction), recognition and enforcement
might still be required.
(3) Assume that a married couple resides in Alabama, that they divorce, and that the wife is made legal custodian of their child by an Alabama court. Assume further that she moves to California with the child.
If the husband, who continues to reside in Alabama, goes back to court
and obtains a change of custody making him the legal custodian after the
mother and child have been gone five months, may California modify the
Alabama decree? (This hypothetical presents the same facts as the first
hypothetical, but the issue is modification.) Assuming that not more than
five months have passed at the time the modification is sought, there are
several reasons why concluding that California could modify the Alabama
decree would be difficult. First, until six months have passed, concluding
that California has jurisdiction under section 3 would be difficult, because
California has not yet become the new home state of the child, although an
argument could be made for significant connection/substantial evidence
jurisdiction. Secondly, concluding that the Alabama court "does not now
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this Act" under UCCJA section 14, would be difficult because
Alabama has been the child's home state within six months before the California modification proceeding was commenced.
(4) If, under the same facts as the third hypothetical, the Alabama
modification results from a proceeding instituted more than six months
after the legal custodian and the child have moved to California, and the
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child and the legal custodian have established a home in California for six
months or more, could California modify the Alabama modification decree? California would be the child's new home state. Before California
could modify the Alabama decree, however, under the literal language of
UCCJA section 14 it would have to be determined that Alabama has lost
continuing jurisdiction because it "does not now have jurisdiction under
jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this Act," that
is, because there is no longer any significant connection/substantial evidence jurisdiction. Of course, the same continuing jurisdiction dilemma is
again evident. 3 32 Given the nonuniform interpretations of the UCCJA by
the jurisdictions that have enacted it, how long continuing jurisdiction continues is entirely unclear.
D. Comparison of the UCCIA with the Texas Family Code
Texas has not adopted the UCCJA. Moreover, although the pertinent
Family Code provisions concerning the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 333 and recognition of foreign decrees 334 are facially similar to the
fundamentally at vaUCCJA's provisions, the Texas legislative scheme is335
riance with the UCCJA for two important reasons.
First, unlike sections 3 and 12 of the UCCJA, under the provisions of
the Texas Family Code 336 personal jurisdiction is necessary before a nonresident parent may be bound by a determination of managing conservatorship. Section 11.045 supplements and limits the broad provisions of
section 11.051, but section 11.045 is not a jurisdictional grant. 337 The opinion of the Dallas court of civil appeals in Perry v. Ponder,338 however,
narrows the gap between Texas and UCCJA jurisdictions. The court in
Perry held that personal jurisdiction does not require minimum contacts
in the old InternationalShoe sense when the child and one of the child's
parents have been in Texas long enough to give Texas a "sovereign's interest in and responsibility for the child's welfare and to provide access to
sufficient evidence to make an informed decision concerning the child's
best interests. ' 339 By applying the new methods of due process thinking
332. See supra notes 303-16 and accompanying text.
333. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.045, 11.051, 11.052 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); see also
supra Part A.
334. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.053 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). For a discussion of the
mechanics of enforcing child custody decrees, see infra Part C, III.
335. For a review of the Texas Family Code and the requirements of due process, see
supra Part A.
336. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.045, 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).

337. See Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 313-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no
writ). But see In re M.S.B., 611 S.W.2d 704, 705-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no
writ) (unsound interpretation of both Perry P. Ponder and § 11.045); Sampson, supra note
158, at 30-31 ("I think we do it better in Texas .... [B]y statute we take the position that it
is unfair to attempt to bind an absent parent to a custody determination unless personal
jurisdiction, in the old-fashioned InternationalShoe sense, is warranted.").
338. 604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
339. Id at 318.
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embodied in Shaffer v. Heitner,34° Perry makes it abundantly clear that
some type of personal jurisdiction is prerequisite to the making of a child
custody determination that will be binding upon a nonresident under the
Texas Family Code. 34 1 Perry sensibly rejects the subject matter jurisdiction approach to child custody jurisdictional issues.
The second major difference is that unlike the interpretation given
UCCJA section 14 by some courts and commentators, 342 under comparable provisions of the Texas Family Code343 a Texas trial court may not
exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify a determination of managing
conservatorship after the managing conservator and the child have left
Texas and have established a new principal residence in another state for
more than six months, unless the action was filed and pending before the
end of the six-month period.
Consequently, both in terms of initial and continuing jurisdiction, the
Texas legislative scheme takes a more restrained view of the propriety of
subjecting a nonresident to a binding custody decree than its UCCJA
counterparts. 344 More particularly, the Texas Family Code takes a much
more restrictive view 345
of the continuing jurisdiction question than some
UCCJA jurisdictions.
II.

THE PARENTAL KIDNAPING PREVENTION ACT OF

A.

1980

Significance of Legislation

Prior to the adoption of the PKPA, the questions concerning the recognition, enforcement, and modification of sister state decrees by Texas
courts were controlled by the provisions of title 2 of the Texas Family
Code and the due process and full faith and credit requirements of the
United States Constitution. Familiarity with the interstices and interpretive problems inherent in the UCCJA was only of marginal importance to
the question of whether a Texas court could or should exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction to modify a child custody decree rendered in a sister state.
With the passage of the PKPA, the analysis has been federalized. Sister
state decrees made consistently with the federal act's provisions must be
enforced and not modified unless modification is permitted under the federal act's provisions. Moreover, since the federal act's provisions on the
modification issue depend heavily upon the decree state's interpretation of
its own continuing jurisdiction, an understanding of how the sister state
interprets its version of the UCCJA is extremely relevant to the question of
340.
341.
Christi
S.W.2d
342.
343.
344.
345.

433 U.S. 186 (1977).
See also Thornlow v. Thornlow, 576 S.W.2d 697, 699 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
1979, writ dism'd w.o.j.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980); Hilt v. Kirkpatrick, 538
849, 851-52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ); supra Part A.
See supra notes 303-16 and accompanying text.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.052 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
See generally Sampson, supra note 158, at 30-31.
Id. at 31.
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whether a Texas court could or should exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
to modify a child custody decree rendered in a sister state.

I.

B. Full Faith and Credit Given to Child Custody Determinations
Mandatory Recognition and Enforcement

Section 8 of the PKPA provides for the amendment of title 28 of the
United States Code by the addition of section 1738A, which is entitled
"Full faith and credit given to child custody determinations. ' 346 As the
title suggests, the section is aimed squarely at the plurality opinion and the
interpretive concurrence in May v. Anderson .347 Subsection (a) of section
1738A requires the authorities of every state to enforce a child custody
determination 34 8 made by a court of another state when the child custody
determination is made consistently with the provisions of section 1738A.
Moreover, except as provided in subsection (f) of section 1738A, modification of a sister state decree made consistently with section 1738A's federal
situational requirements is also prohibited.
The personal jurisdiction approach taken by Justice Burton's plurality
opinion in May v. Anderson is not incorporated in section 1738A. Subsection (e) of section 1738A, however, provides that "[blefore a child custody
determination is made, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard
shall be given to the contestants. '349 In addition, reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard must be given to any parent 350 whose parental
rights have not been previously terminated and to any person who has
physical custody of a child.
Federal Situational Requirements
Subsection (c) of section 1738A sets the basic ground rules for the determination of whether a child custody determination is consistent with the
provisions of section 1738A. A child custody determination made by a
state court is consistent only if the situational requirements of the subsection are met and the court "has jurisdiction under the law of such
State."' 35' The situational requirements are substantially similar to section
3 of the UCCJA. Satisfaction of one of the following conditions is
necessary:
(1) The forum state is the home state of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding. Home state means the state in which,
immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with its parents, a
parent, or a person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive months.
2

346. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980).

347. See supra text accompanying notes 268-77.
348. "'[C]ustody determination' means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court
providing for the custody or visitation of a child and includes permanent and temporary
orders, and initial orders and modifications ...... 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(3) (Supp. IV
1980).

349. Id.§ 1738A(e).

350. The term "parent" is not defined to exclude fathers of illegitimate children.
351. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
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as
In the case of a child less than six months old, the home state is defined'352
"the State in which the child lived from birth with any of such persons.
(2) The forum state had been the child's home state within six months
before the commencement of the proceedings, but the child is absent from
the state and a contestant (a person, including a parent, who claims a right
to custody or visitation of a child) continues to live in the forum state. The
because of its retention or removal
reason for the child's absence may be
3 53
by a contestant or for other reasons.
(3) Assumption of jurisdiction by a court of the forum state is in the
best interest of the child because: (a) the child and its parents, or the child
and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with the forum
state, other than mere physical presence; and (b) "substantial evidence
concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships" is available in the forum state. On the other hand, if
the child has a home state or had a home state within six months before
and a contestant continues to live
the commencement of the proceeding
354
unavailable.
is
alternative
there, this
is physically present in the forum state, and the child has
(4) The child 355
been abandoned.
(5) The child is physically present in the forum state, and immediate
it has been subjected to or
protection of the child is necessary because
356
threatened with mistreatment or abuse.

(6) The court of the forum state has continuing jurisdiction under its
own law, the initial child custody determination made by the forum state
the forum
was made consistently with the provisions of section 1738A, and
357
state remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.
(7) No other state would have jurisdiction because no other state is:
(a) the child's home state; (b) the last home state in which a contestant
lived and from which the child has not been absent for more than six
months; (c) the state with which the child and a contestant have a significant connection; (d) the state where the child has been abandoned or is
threatened; or (e) another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that the state whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate
forum, and the forum state's assumption of jurisdiction is in the best interest of the child. 358 In other words, when none of the other subdivisions of
section 1738A(c)(2) solves the jurisdictional question, the decision to adjudicate is based upon the general concept of the child's best interest. Since
352. Id. § 1738A(b)(4).
353. Id § 1738A(c)(2)(A). Although the section seemingly is aimed at the child snatcher,
it is broad enough to include other factual contexts.
354. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(B). Consequently, unlike UCCJA § 3, significant connection/
substantial evidence jurisdiction is not available as an alternative to home state or old home
state jurisdiction.
355. Id § 1738A(c)(2)(C)(i).
356. Id § 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii).
357. Id § 1738A(c)(2)(E).
358. Id § 1738A(c)(2)(D).
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this concept is presumably the basis for making a child custody determination, the jurisdictional issue and the resolution of the dispute on the merits
coalesce.
3.

When Modification Is Permissible

Subdivision (f) of section 1738A sets the ground rules for the modification of child custody determinations made by a court of another state.
Modification is permissible if the court requested to modify the foreign
decree "has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination," and
"the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction" or has declined to
exercise its jurisdiction.3 59 Because continuing jurisdiction is allowed to
continue as long as the court that rendered the original decree has continuing jurisdiction under its own law when "such state remains the residence
of the child or of any contestant," continuing jurisdiction is substantially
preferred. This preference exists unless the original court has declined to
exercise its continuing jurisdiction or all contestants have moved from the
jurisdiction that rendered the initial decree. For example, for litigation
problems involving those UCCJA jurisdictions that interpret UCCJA sections 3 and 14 to provide that continuing jurisdiction continues on an exclusive basis as long as one contestant remains there, section 1738A
precludes a sister state from modifying the decree in question. The argument could be made that a limitation is imposed on the requirement that
full faith and credit be given to a sister state's decree if the child affected by
the decree has acquired a new home state; however, when the decree state
has a broad view of its continuing jurisdiction, reaching this result under
the language of the PKPA is difficult.
4. Simultaneous Proceedings
Subdivision (g) of section 1738A prohibits a court from exercising jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody determination commenced during
the pendency of proceedings in another state "where such court of that
other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this
'360
section to make a custody determination.
5.

Other Provisions

Section 8 of the PKPA encourages state courts to "afford priority to proceedings for custody determinations.' 36 1 PKPA section 8 also encourages
"award to the person entitled to custody or visitation . . . necessary travel
expenses, attorneys' fees, costs of private investigations, witness fees or expenses, and other expenses" when appropriate. The statutory section specifically identifies two situations in which such an award is appropriate.
The first situation is when a contestant has, without the consent of the
359. Id § 1738A(O.
360. Id. § 1738A(g).

361. Id § 1738A (Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose at 683).
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person entitled to custody or visitation, wrongfully removed the child from
the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or visitation. Similarly, expenses may be awarded to the nonconsenting party when the child
is wrongfully retained after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of
362
physical custody.
Section 9 of the PKPA provides for the use of the federal Parent Locater
Service in connection with the enforcement or determination of child custody and in cases of parental kidnaping. 363 Section 10 contains an express
declaration of congressional intent that the Fugitive Felon Act be applied
"to cases involving parental kidnaping and interstate or international flight
to avoid prosecution under applicable State felony statutes. '364
III.

ENFORCEMENT OF SISTER STATE CUSTODY AWARDS UNDER THE
TEXAS FAMILY CODE

A.

Section 14.10. Habeas Corpus

Texas Family Code section 14.10365 is the basic enforcement device for
compelling compliance with both domestic and foreign child custody
awards. If the right to possession of a child is governed by a court order,
then in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the right to possession of the
child the court must compel the return of the child to the person entitled to
possession by virtue of the court order.366 The trial court is required to:
[D]isregard any cross action or motion pending for modification of the
decree determining managing conservatorship, possession, or support
of or access to the child unless it finds that:
(1) the previous order was granted by a court that did not have
jurisdiction of the parties; or
(2) the child has not been in the relator's possession and control
for at least 6 months367immediately preceding the filing of the
petition for the writ.
Moreover, section 14.10 provides that while in the state for the sole purpose of compelling the return of a child through a habeas corpus proceeding, the relator is not amenable to civil process and is not subject to the
jurisdiction of any civil court except the court in which the writ is pending
and in that court only for the purpose of prosecuting the writ.368
In Lamphere v. Chrisman369 the Supreme Court of Texas concluded that
the legislature, by enacting a substantially similar predecessor version of
section 14.10,370 intended to change the rule that the right to possession of
362. Id.
363. 42 U.S.C. § 654 (Supp. IV 1980).
364. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (Supp. V 1981); see id § 1073 (1976).

365.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 14.10 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).

366. Id § 14.10(a).
367. Id § 14.10(b).
368. Id. § 14.10(d).
369. 554 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1977).
370. In 1977 the legislature modified § 14.10 by revising subdivision b. The version of
the section before amendment provided the following:
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a child could be readjudicated in a hearing on an application for a writ of
habeas corpus. The general practice under the Family Code section was
summarized in the following terms:
The general rule now is that the writ should be granted when the relator shows that he or she is entitled to custody of the child by virtue of
a valid and subsisting court order. The right to possession may not be
relitigated in the habeas corpus hearing; the relator is entitled to an
issuance of the writ immediately on a showing of his or her right to
custody. . . . Further, mandamus is a proper remedy to compel enforcement of the relator's right to custody. . . . For these purposes,
we recognize no differences between valid custody orders of our state
of sister states beyond the distinctions set forth in the
and those
37
statute. I
Section 14.10(C) 372 provides, however, that the court may issue any appropriate temporary order if there is a serious immediate question concerning the child's welfare. The cases clearly indicate that this statutory
provision is not a loophole authorizing a trial court to refuse to enforce a
custody decree instanter. In Marshall v. Wilson 373 Bonita and William
Pacheco were divorced in Texas in 1975. Bonita was named managing
conservator of their daughter. Subsequently, Bonita remarried and moved
with her new husband and the child to Tennessee. On February 22, 1981,
William Pacheco drove to Tennessee and convinced Bonita's new husband, Danny Marshall, to surrender the child to him under circumstances
apparently amounting to kidnaping. Pacheco immediately brought the
child back to Texas. Apparently, immediately thereafter Bonita and two
friends came to Texas and tried forcibly to retrieve the child from Pacheco
and his new wife at an establishment called Jose's Place. On February 25,
1981, Pacheco commenced a new proceeding to modify the prior order for
managing conservatorship. He also sought and obtained a temporary order prohibiting the mother's interference with his possession of the child.
Bonita filed a habeas corpus proceeding two days after Pacheco's modification suit was filed. After a hearing, the trial court denied the habeas
corpus. Thereafter, Bonita sought a writ of mandamus from the Texas
Supreme Court. While determining that the trial court erred in denying
the habeas corpus, the supreme court explained the proper approach to be
(b) The court shall disregard any cross action or motion pending for modification of the decree determining managing conservatorship, possession, or
support of or access to the child unless it finds that the previous order was
granted by a court of another state or nation and that:
(1) the court did not have jurisdiction of the parties; or
(2) the child has been within the state for at least 12 months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition for the writ.
TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 14.10 (Vernon 1975) (amended 1977).

37 1. Lamphere v. Chrisman, 554 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex. 1977) (citations omitted); see also
Strobel v. Thurman, 565 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex. 1978) ("Upon proof of the prior order, absent dire emergency which is not here urged and which under the facts proved does not exist,
the grant of the writ should be automatic, immediate and ministerial. The writ [of habeas
corpus] should be granted upon proof of the bare legal right to possession. Section 14.10.");
Trader v. Dear, 565 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex. 1978).
372. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§

14.10(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).

373. 616 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1981).
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taken in the enforcement of conservatorship decrees pursuant to section
14.10:
The Texas Legislature enacted a simple procedure designed to stop
kidnaping such as happened at Dickson, Tennessee; [attempted]
child-snatching such as happened at Jose's Place; and the frustration
of outstanding orders for managing conservatorship such as the trial
court's restraining order has done. The party armed with an order for
managing conservatorship is entitled to its enforcement instanter.
The hearing for the enforcement is not a readjudication of managing
conservatorship. . . . What has happened in this case defeats the legislative plan to stop self-help in custody fights. Bonita was entitled to
made immune from
the writ of habeas corpus, and she was by statute 374
the collateral litigation while prosecuting the writ.
In Lamphere v. Chrisman375 the supreme court had previously concluded that the language of section 14.10 compelling the trial judge to disregard a cross-action did not require the trial court to dismiss the crossaction or motion to modify. Section 14.10 provides that the relator is not
amenable to civil process and is not subject to the jurisdiction of any civil
court except the court in which the writ is pending and in that court only
for the purpose of prosecuting the writ. After prosecution of the writ, the
immunity from collateral litigation ends. Thereafter, if jurisdiction over
the nonresident exists pursuant to section 11.051's 376 situational requirements, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is not offended, and neither section 11.045377 nor section 11.052378 precludes the
exercise of jurisdiction, the cross-action or motion to modify may be litigated. 379 In many instances, however, the immunity from civil process
provided by section 14.10(d) will mean that after the right to possession
pursuant to a court order is determined, the respondent must necessarily
litigate the modification suit where the nonresident relator and the child
reside because the cross-action will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
More complex issues are presented by the exceptions provided in section
14.10(b). The following hypothetical cases are designed to illustrate when
the trial court need not disregard a cross-action or motion to modify.
(1) Assume that a husband and wife are divorced in Ohio, the wife is
made the managing conservator of the child, and the father receives visitation privileges for one week during the December holiday season and for
Marshall v. Wilson, 616 S.W.2d 932, 933, 934 (Tex. 1981) (emphasis added). For a
analysis, see Perry v. Scoggins, 626 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1981).
554 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Tex. 1977).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
Id. § 11.045.
Id. § 11.052.
[A]fter the writ is either issued or denied, the trial court is free to continue
with the disposition of any suits or motions for change of custody. The jurisdictional or other questions raised in the change of custody suit may then be
considered on appeal from the final judgment in that suit. To the extent that
the holding in In re Kamont, 537 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-1976, writ refd
n.r.e.) may conflict with our views, it is disapproved.
Lamphere v. Chrisman, 554 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Tex. 1977).

374.
similar
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
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the summer months. Assume further that the father remarries and moves
to Texas. If the father retains possession of the child after the expiration of
his summer visitation period, section 14.10 should provide the mother a
speedy remedy for securing possession of the child. Any cross-action or
motion pending for modification should be disregarded and the mother
would be immune from civil process and collateral litigation while prosecuting the writ.
(2) Under the same basic facts as the foregoing hypothetical case, assume that the father retains possession of the child under an agreement
with his ex-wife that the child stay in Texas for the school year following
the expiration of the summer visitation period. If the father and his new
wife wish to keep the child with them for yet another school year, may the
mother resort to habeas corpus to enforce the Ohio decree despite the fact
that the child has resided in Texas for almost one year? May the father
bring a cross-action or prosecute a modification suit filed before the institution of the habeas corpus proceeding? Will a Texas court have jurisdiction to make the father the managing conservator? Finally, even if there is
jurisdiction to litigate the custody issue, what standard will the Texas court
use to decide the conservatorship issue? Since the child has not been in the
mother's "possession and control for at least 6 months immediately preceding the filing of the petition for the writ" of habeas corpus, if the
mother sought to compel the return of the child by habeas corpus, the
grant of the writ would not be "automatic, immediate, and ministerial. '3 80
Moreover, the expiration of the six-month period provided for in section
14.10(b)(2) would not require that the husband's cross-action or independent modification motion or action be disregarded until the prosecution of
the writ of habeas corpus is concluded. 38 1 Section 14.10(b) does not, however, provide explicit guidance concerning the trial judge's discretion to
grant the writ of habeas corpus before considering the question of whether
modification is appropriate. 382 In the context of this hypothetical situation, obtaining jurisdiction over the mother may be difficult because her
only contact with Texas was the child's visitation with its father. 383 Section 14.10(d) would still be applicable unless the argument could be made
that since the trial judge does not have a ministerial duty to disregard the
cross-action, the mother could not be "in this state for the sole purpose of
compelling the return of a child through a habeas corpus proceeding" 384
after the expiration of the section 14. 10(b)(2) six-month period. This result
would occur because, of necessity, she would also be in Texas to defend
the modification proceeding. If she is amenable to process and subject to
380. See Strobel v. Thurman, 565 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex. 1978).
381. The husband's filing of a "petition" rather than a motion to modify should not
matter. Technically, a motion to modify would be inappropriate unless the court in which
the modification of conservatorship is sought constitutes a court of continuing jurisdiction.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
382. See Gray v. Rankin, 594 S.W.2d 409, 409 (Tex. 1980).
383. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). But see Perry v. Ponder, 604
S.W.2d 306, 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (distinguishing Kulko).
384. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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the trial court's jurisdiction on the modification issue, there still is no assurance that the father will prevail. If the standards for modification set
forth in section 14.08385 are used, then in the average case the father will
probably have difficulty prevailing on the merits.
B.

Section 14.08. Modiflcation

Section 14.08 imposes a heavy burden on modification motions filed
within one year after the issuance date of the order or decree to be modified. 386 Before a hearing may be obtained, the motion must be supported
by an affidavit containing at least one of the following allegations along
with supportive facts: (1) the child's present environment may endanger
its physical health or significantly impair its emotional development; or
(2) the managing conservator is the person seeking the modification or
consents to the modification and the modification is in the best interest of
the child. 387 If the court determines that the supportive facts stated in the
affidavit are adequate to support an allegation, the court is required to set
a hearing. 38 8 Unless the court determines that adequate facts support one
or both of the allegations, however, the trial court is required to deny the
389
motion to modify and to refuse to schedule a hearing.
In addition, the standard for modification of conservatorship is stringent. The trial court may modify an order or portion of a decree that
designates a managing conservator if the circumstances of the child or the
child's managing conservator 390 have so materially and substantially
changed since the entry of the order or decree that the retention of the
present managing conservator would be injurious to the child's welfare
and the appointment of new managing conservator would be a positive
improvement for the child. 39 1 In the ordinary case, satisfying the requirement that the retention of the present managing conservator would be injurious to the child's welfare will be difficult. It is not completely clear,
however, that the restrictions imposed upon the modification of a decree
set forth in section 14.08 are applicable to proceedings in which modification 392 of a sister state decree is sought. Possibly, when the sister state law
385. Id. § 14.08(c).
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Id § 14.08(d).
Id.
Id. § 14.08(e).
Id
Jones v. Jones, 626 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. 1981).

391.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). A lesser standard is

imposed upon a movant who seeks a modification concerning the support of the child, "except that an order providing for the support of a child may be modified only as to obligations accruing subsequent to the motion to modify;" the terms and conditions for access to or
possession of a child; or the relative rights, privileges, duties, and powers of conservators,
short of a conservatorship modification. These matters may be modified "if the circumstances of the child or a person affected by the order or portion of the decree to be modified
have materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order or decree." Id
§ 14.08(c)(2).
392.

Actually, to speak in terms of the modification of a foreign decree is a misstatement

of what occurs. A Texas decree may provide for a different set of rights and responsibilities
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permits modification more readily, the law of the sister state that made the
order or decree allegedly in need of modification should be applied rather
than the relatively stringent standards of section 14.08 of the Texas Family
Code. Finally, when enforcement of a sister state decree is sought in Texas
and the decree was rendered by a UCCJA state that takes the position that
its jurisdiction continues for as long as one contestant remains there, pursuant to the PKPA a Texas court is probably compelled to enforce and not
modify the sister state decree unless the sister state declines to exercise its
continuing jurisdiction.
C. Impact of the PKPA on Sections 14.08 and 14.10
L

Hypothetical Cases

The two bases for not disregarding "any cross action or motion pending
for modification" under Texas Family Code section 14.10 may be superseded by the provisions of the PKPA. The following hypothetical cases
illustrate the impact of the PKPA.
(1) Assume that a UCCJA state makes a decree, and the legal custodian moves with the child to Texas and establishes a principal residence in
Texas for more than six months. Assume further that under the UCCJA
jurisdiction's interpretation of continuing jurisdiction, the UCCJA state
continues to have jurisdiction to modify. Does section 1738A require
Texas to enforce the decree and to disregard any motion to modify it? The
answer appears to be yes. Section 1738A requires that the appropriate authorities of each state enforce and not modify any child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of section 1738A except as
provided in section 1738A(f). Subsection (f) permits modification if:
(a) the court of the state in which the modification is sought has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination; and (b) the court of the state
that made the decree no longer has jurisdiction or has declined to exercise
it. 393 Before a child custody determination is made consistently with the
requirements of section 1738A, the court must have jurisdiction under its
own law to make the child custody determination. 394 In addition, one of
the situational requirements of section 1738A must be satisfied. One of the
situational requirements, however, is that "the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this section. '395 Subsection (d) provides: "The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child
custody determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1)396 of this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or of any
from a previously made decree of another state. The foreign decree, however, is modified
only in an extremely theoretical sense of that term.
393. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(t) (Supp. IV 1980).
394. Id § 1738A(c)(1).
395. Id § 1738A(c)(2)(e).
396. Id § 1738A(c)(1) provides that "such court has jurisdiction under the law of such
State."
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contestant. ' 397 Thus, assuming that the UCCJA state has continuing jurisdiction under its own law, if one contestant remains there the decree must
be enforced. Also, the decree must be enforced even though sections
11.052 and 11.053 of the Texas Family Code suggest otherwise. Hence,
any cross-action or modification motion would be properly disregarded
despite section 14.10's suggestion to the contrary.
(2) Assume that a UCCJA state makes a decree and the mother is
made legal custodian. The husband abducts the child and comes to Texas
where he resides with the child for one year. When the wife, who continues to reside in the decree state, seeks to enforce the decree by habeas
corpus, may the husband assert a cross-action seeking a change of custody
pursuant to the second exception set forth in section 14.10(b)? After the
enactment of the PKPA, the answer appears to be "no" when the UCCJA
state has continuing jurisdiction under its own law. The analysis is the
same as in the preceding hypothetical.
(3) Assume the same facts as in the preceding hypothetical except that
instead of being abducted, the child was voluntarily delivered to Texas by
the legal custodian for an indefinite period while the custodian ran a business in the decree state. May a cross-action be asserted? Again, despite
the fact that more than six months has elapsed, section 1738A compels
enforcement without modification if the decree state's jurisdiction continues under its own law.
2. Conclusion
In summary, the provisions of section 14.10, which suggest that a crossaction for modification could be considered when "the child has not been
in the relator's possession and control for at least 6 months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition for the writ" 398 of habeas corpus pursuant to section 14.10, have been displaced by section 1738A when the foreign decree is rendered by a UCCJA jurisdiction which takes the view that
its jurisdiction continues. Moreover, enforcement of sister state decrees
does not depend upon whether the decrees were made under statutory provisions consistent with the Texas Family Code, but upon whether they
were made consistently with the PKPA.
IV.

RECOGNITION, ENFORCEMENT, AND MODIFICATION UNDER THE
TEXAS FAMILY CODE

Several provisions of title 2 of the Texas Family Code concern the enforcement of sister state orders arising from litigation fitting the definition
of a "suit affecting the parent-child relationship. ' 39 9 Section 11.05340o
provides:
397. Id § 1738A(d).
398. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).

399. A suit affecting the parent-child relationship is defined in id § 11.01(5). For the text
of this section, see supra note 185.
400. Id. § 11.053.
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A court of this state shall recognize and enforce an original or modified final decree granted by a court of another state and entered in
litigation that would have been a suit affecting the parent-child relationship in this state unless it is shown that the out-of-state court did
not exercise jurisdiction under statutory authority substantially in ac40
cordance with the jurisdictional prerequisites of this code.
The key questions with respect to the interpretation of section 11.053 are:
(1) whether it permits modification of an initial or modification decree of a
sister state after the sister state's order has been recognized and enforced;
and (2) under what circumstances it may be said that the out-of-state court
did not exercise jurisdiction under statutory authority substantially in accordance with the jurisdictional prerequisites of the Family Code. A
Texas court is required to give full faith and credit to sister state child
support decrees that are not modifiable retroactively. Hence, child support
awards entitled to full faith and credit obviously cannot be modified retroactively regardless of how section 11.053 is interpreted in other contexts.
A more difficult question is presented when the sister state order concerns the custody of a child. Although the standard for modification of
conservatorship may differ among jurisdictions, subsequent modification is
generally permissible in the state that made the initial custody determination. Thus, to the extent that full faith and credit principles require recognition and enforcement, modification is not precluded; no state is required
to give the award more faith and credit than it would receive where it was
rendered. Similarly, the Texas interpretation of the relationship of the full
faith and credit clause to child custody litigation has permitted modification of a sister state decree under certain circumstances even though the
Texas Supreme Court has concluded that initial and modification decrees
of sister states are entitled to full faith and credit. Consequently, section
11.053 does not prohibit the modification of sister state custody determina4°2
tions that are entitled to recognition and enforcement.
With respect to the second issue, section 11.045403 of the Texas Family
Code provides that a court has original jurisdiction of a suit affecting the
parent-child relationship only if one of the following conditions is met:
(1) Texas is the principal residence 404 of the child at the time the proceed401. Section 11.053 bears some resemblance to section 13 of the UCCJA:
The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification
decree of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this Act or which was made
under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the Act, so
long as this decree had not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional
standards substantially similar to those of this Act.
UCCJA § 13, 9 U.L.A. at 151. The UCCJA leaves the issue of modification of a decree of
another state to § 14, a provision that has no counterpart in the Texas Family Code.
402. If the standard for modification of a sister state decree is the one embodied in TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), then in many cases the standard would
not be met easily. Whether Texas law would set the standard is unclear.
403. Id. § 11.045.

404. The term "principal residence" is not defined. Section 11.045 was adapted from
UCCJA § 3, 9 U.L.A. at 122. Section 3 uses the term "home state," rather than "principal
residence." A "home state" is defined as:
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ing is commenced; (2) Texas was the principal residence of the child at any
time during the six-month period before the proceeding was commenced,
and a parent 40 5 or person acting as a parent resides in Texas at the time the
proceeding is commenced; (3) assumption of jurisdiction by a Texas court
is in the best interest of the child because the child and the child's parents
or the child and at least one contestant have a significant connection with
Texas and substantial evidence is available in Texas concerning the child's
present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(4) assumption of jurisdiction by a Texas court is in the best interest of the
child because the child is physically present in Texas and there is a serious
immediate question concerning the welfare of the child; or assumption of
jurisdiction by a Texas court is in the best interest of the child because it
appears that no other state would have jurisdiction "under prerequisites
substantially in accordance with this section," or another state has declined
to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that Texas is the more appropriate
forum to determine issues concerning the child.
Section 11.045 probably is not a jurisdictional grant authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction independently of section 11.05 1.40 6 Since the words
"only if" appear before the description of the conditions under which a
Texas court may exercise jurisdiction, 40 7 section 11.045 serves as a limitation on the broader language of section 11.051408 and, to the extent that
Texas procedural rule 108409 is a basis for exercising jurisdiction over nonresidents, a limitation upon the broad language of the last sentence of rule
108. Consequently, to the extent that section 11.051 and rule 108 make
personal jurisdiction prerequisite to the rendition of a judgment binding
upon a nonresident, a sister state decree would not be made under "statutory authority substantially in accordance with the jurisdictional prerequisites of this code" unless the nonresident was subject to personal
jurisdiction. 4 10 This approach differs from the one taken by the almost
[T]he state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived
with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least 6 consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than 6 months old the state in
which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods

of temporary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part of the
6-month or other period.
Id § 2(5), 9 U.L.A. at 119; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
405. The term "parent" is defined in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.01(3) (Vernon 1975);

for the text of the section, see supra note 170.
406. One court of civil appeals concluded that the section is a jurisdictional grant. In re
M.S.B., 611 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ). This decision disregards the literal wording of the section. See also Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
407. See UCCJA § 3, 9 U.L.A. at 122.
408. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). For a full discussion of
this Family Code long-arm provision, see supra text accompanying notes 159-233.
409. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108.
410. See supra notes 317-20 and accompanying text. When the sister state order constitutes a child custody determination within the definition of that term contained in the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, recognition and enforcement may be compelled and
modification prohibited under circumstances insufficient to satisfy § 11.053.
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universally enacted Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. 4 11
A similar limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction is imposed by section
11.052 of the Family Code. 4 12 Enacted in 1979, section 11.052 concerns
exceptions to the exercise of continuing jurisdiction. It provides that a
Texas court may not exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify "the
appointment of a managing conservator if the managing conservator and
the child have established and continued to maintain their principal residence in another state for more than six months unless the action was filed
and pending before the six-month period .... ,,413 Section 11.052(a)(2)
contains an exception to the exercise of continuing jurisdiction to modify
"any part of a decree if all of the parties and the child have established and
continue to maintain their principal residence outside this state. ' 4 14 There
is no durational period. The limitations on the exercise of continuing jurisdiction in section 11.052(a) do not affect the power of the court of continuing jurisdiction to enforce or enter a judgment on its decree.4 1 5
Moreover, the original court retains its continuing jurisdiction to address
other possible issues of modification, such as visitation, support, and
grandparents' access, as long as one of the parties continues to maintain a
4 16
principal residence in Texas.
Under this relatively restrained approach, a Texas court loses its jurisdiction to modify a conservatorship decree after the child and the child's
managing conservator move from Texas to another state and establish a
new principal residence there for more than six months. The loser of the
initial custody litigation is prevented from relitigating the conservatorship
issue after the six-month period. This treatment of the continuing jurisdiction question may differ from the approach taken by the almost universally
enacted Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. 4 17 Consequently, to the
extent that a UCCJA state permits a redetermination of the conservatorship issue after the expiration of a six-month period of the type described
in section 11.052 of the Family Code, section 11.053 does not compel its
recognition and enforcement in Texas because the redetermination is not
"under statutory authority substantially in accordance with the jurisdictional prerequisites of this code. '41 8 The Parental Kidnaping Prevention
411. See Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 311-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ)
(attempt at analyzing due process jurisdictional requirements in context of custody
litigation).
412. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.052 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
413. Id. § 11.052(a)(1).
414. Id. § 11.052(a)(2).
415. Id.§ 11.052(b).

416. See Sampson, supra note 158, at 31. Also, § 11.052 is not an independent jurisdictional grant, and § 11.051 and principles of due process would necessarily place limits on the
unrestrained exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident.
417. See Bodenheimer, InterstateCustody, supra note 305, at 215-25 (continuing jurisdiction ends only if all the parties have taken up residence in other states, or if the decree state
has declined to exercise its modification jurisdiction); see also Ratner, supra note 305. For a
full discussion of the conflict in decisions concerning the proper interpretation of the continuing jurisdiction provisions of the UCCJA among the various states that have enacted it, see
supra notes 303-16 and accompanying text.
418. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.053 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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Act of 1980, 4 19 however, may compel recognition and enforcement and
prohibit modification of conservatorship decrees that would not satisfy section 11.053's requirements.
PART D.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of the almost universal adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the passage of the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, for Texas to continue with Family Code provisions that
conflict with the provisions of the UCCJA (assuming the latter enactment
is properly interpreted) makes no sense. During its next legislative session
the Texas Legislature should seriously consider the adoption of the
UCCJA and the repeal of sections 11.045, 11.052, and 11.053 of the Texas
Family Code. The legislature should amend section 11.051 of the Texas
Family Code so as to leave no doubt that a court's jurisdiction 4 20 to make
a child's custody determination by initial or modification decree does not
require the same relationship between the defendant and the forum ("minimum contacts") as is required in other suits affecting the parent-child relationship because the relationship between the forum and the litigation
problem (the state's interest) is particularily strong in custody cases. Theoretical arguments concerning the constitutionality of the jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJA have very little present-day appeal as a result of the
almost universal adoption of the UCCJA, the enactment of the PKPA by
Congress, and the continuing interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause by the United States Supreme Court. When properly
interpreted, the jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJA are perfectly compatible with modern due process methodology derived from the Supreme
Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner. Moreover, the Bodenheimer problem concerning exclusive, continuing jurisdiction can be avoided by Texas
courts in much the same manner that it has been avoided in other jurisdictions. In this latter respect, the Texas Legislature should resist the temptation to improve upon the technical language of the UCCJA. Legislative
tinkering with the provisions of the Uniform Act will only exacerbate the
complex problems that already face the interstate child.

419. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980).
420. In footnote 30 of Shaffer v. Heitner the Supreme Court did not revive the in rem
wing of Pennoyer v. Neff. Justice Guittard correctly reasoned in Perry v. Ponder that the
references to status in Shaffer did not imply that because status is a res, it can be determined
in the absence of personal jurisdiction. He therefore rejected the argument that status adjudications are an exception to the personal jurisdiction requirement. Instead, Justice Guittard interpreted Shaffer's references to status as recognizing the state's strong interest in
adjudications affecting family relationships. Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 314 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1980, no writ). Accordingly, the pertinent question in child custody cases is
whether the court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, not
merely whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.

